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Imperial Roman trading activity within the Indian Ocean has received increasing attention from 
scholars during the last few decades, much of it considering the role played by the Roman state. 
These studies have convincingly shown that state involvement was motivated, primarily, by 
the lucrative revenue that could be obtained via taxation and this thesis takes this as the 
foremost reason for state participation. Despite this strong motivation the nature of the 
relationship between the Roman state and the Indian Ocean trade is debated. On the one hand, 
scholars such as Nappo, Wilson, Bowman, Cobb and Sidebotham see this relationship as one 
of intimate and often proactive involvement. This included the provision of facilities that were 
vital for trade and the deployment of the military to support commercial activity. On the other 
hand, while Young has recognised the extensive state provision of roads, ports, and the military 
he views the nature of state involvement as fundamentally reactive and limited in some cases 
to little more than monitoring activity. 
It is due to these essentially contradicting positions that the aim of this thesis is to explore the 
nature of the relationship between the Indian Ocean trade and the Roman state and to examine 
the mechanisms by which the state interacted with this important sector of the economy. This 
will be achieved through considering the involvement of the state (using a large portion of 
Egypt’s military garrison) by providing security and potable water in the Eastern Desert and 
the Red Sea and how these activities were supervised by officials in the region. Through this 
analysis it will be proposed that a more nuanced understanding of the Roman state’s 
relationship with the Indian Ocean trade which combines both the proactive and reactive 
perspectives should be adopted. This will help to improve scholarly understanding of the 
relationship between the Roman state and the economy during the imperial period and will 
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It is a ‘chicken-and-egg’ argument as to whether the lucrative “India-
Arabia” trade as conducted by independent businessmen led to Roman 
governmental involvement to promote it further, especially after the 
annexation of Egypt in 30 B.C.1 
 
Trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea has been conducted via 
Egypt since at least the 2nd millennium BC, centuries before Rome asserted its 
hegemony over the region.2 While the preceding period of this trade is often 
underappreciated, it is undeniable that with Roman involvement came a previously 
unprecedented level of expansion in the scale and investment in commercial activity.3 
These developments made certain goods, such as black pepper, available to a much 
wider consumer base within Mediterranean society than had previously been the case.4 
As a result, it is becoming increasingly clear to scholars that the Indian Ocean trade 
had a significant impact on Roman society.5 While the Roman state’s support and 
involvement in this trade is universally recognised the nature of its relationship to this 
major intercontinental trade remains an important, open-ended and debated question. 
Obtaining a deeper appreciation of this relationship would therefore have important 
implications for both our understanding of the sophistication and the practical 
 
1 Sidebotham, 2015, p.915-916. 
2 Sidebotham, 2011, p.24.  
3  On Ptolemaic trade in the Indian Ocean see Seland, 2008, p.71; Salles, 2015, p.251-268; Cobb, 2018a, p.28-
60; 2018b, 17-51. For the nature of the expansion of the trade in the late 1st century BC see Tomber, 2008, p.18; 
3013, p.114; Tchernia, 1997, p.261; McLaughlin, 2010, 24-28. While Cobb, 2018b, p.34 rightly acknowledges 
the expansion of Mediterranean involvement in the Indian Ocean under Rome he is also correct to caution that 
this should be viewed as a continuation of earlier Ptolemaic efforts rather than a separate development.  
4 Cobb, 2018c, p.519-559.  
5 Morley, 2007, p.39 has argued that the trade was small and comprised mainly of luxuries. However, Morley, 
2008, p.573-574 has argued that not all items were luxuries and that the amount of money invested into the 
Indian Ocean trade shows that it was a significant part of the Roman economy. In contrast, Sidebotham, 1986, 
p.14 and Cobb 2013, p.136-152; Cobb, 2018c, p.519-559 have proven that many goods from the Indian Ocean 
were viewed as important necessities by imperial Roman society. 
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capabilities of the Roman state and its contemporaries regarding the affairs of the 
ancient economy.6   
 
The Roman State and the Indian Ocean Trade  
The nature of the Roman state’s relationship with the Indian Ocean trade is viewed in 
essentially one of two ways. The first of these, which is held by Evers, Cobb, Wilson, Bowman, 
Nappo and Sidebotham, suggests that the state was intimately and, to some degree, proactively 
involved in the Indian Ocean trade. This, they propose, was done through the provision of 
facilities such as roads and harbours and by deploying the military to provide security in the 
Eastern Desert and the Red Sea.7 The second perspective, which is supported by Young takes 
the stance that while the Roman state did make large investments in infrastructure to support 
the trade, beyond this, the nature of its relationship was limited and characteristically reactive. 
Indeed, Young goes one step further and argues that, other than seeking to obtain revenue, 
Rome practised no state policy regarding commercial activity either in Egypt or the whole of 
the East.8 In contrast, Nappo, who expands on work by Sidebotham, takes the first of these two 
views one step further and proposes that Trajan instigated a state policy which sought to make 
the Red Sea a ‘mare internum’ and provide a context which was appropriate for the expansion 
of Indian Ocean commerce.9 For Nappo, the primary markers of this policy were (1) the 
creation of a Red Sea fleet, (2) the annexation of Nabataea, (3) the restoration of the canal 
connecting the Red Sea to the Nile and (4) the occupation of the Farasan Islands.10 While 
Fitzpatrick makes a valid point that Rome would struggle to control the entirety of the Red Sea 
 
6 Finley, 1999 has argued that ancient states had very limited to no involvement in economic affairs. This 
influential view is now changing due to recent volumes such as Wilson and Bowman, 2017, Trade, Commerce, 
and the state in the Roman World. Similarly, Schörle, 2017, p.154 has noted that in academia there has been a 
shift away from the so-called primitivist and modernist models and towards institutional and network analysis.    
7 Wilson and Bowman, 2017, p.2; Sidebotham, 1986, p.113; Adams, 2007, p.197; Cobb 2018a, p.126. Gurkkal, 
2013, p.183 even proposes that Rome’s Indian Ocean trade was wholly under the patronage of the Emperor.    
8 Young, 2001, p.216; 219-2220. The East in this case refers to Egypt, Arabia, Palmyra, and Syria.  
9 Nappo, 2015a, p.71-72; 2016, p.124-125; Sidebotham, 1986, p.113-175. Sidebotham rightly cautions that the 
term ‘policy’ can only be applied retrospectively. Speidel, 2015, p.97-99 takes a similar view to Nappo on the 
attempt to create a mare internum.  
10 Nappo, 2015a, p.69. De Romanis, 2015a, p.125 observes that unlike previous canals connecting the Nile 
valley and the Red Sea Trajan’s canal was continuously maintained. Cooper, 2009, p.197 takes a similar if 
speculative view although he is unsure if the canal of Trajan did function continuously. Aubert, 2015, p.37 notes 
that this project may have been funded by a special one-off tax. This could therefore be indicative of further 
state support for economic activity in Eastern Egypt.   
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by military means Sidebotham and Nappo’s arguments are nonetheless an intriguing premise.11 
Despite this, as the quote above states, Sidebotham himself sees it as impossible to determine 
conclusively if the Roman state proactively promoted an expansion of the Indian Ocean trade. 
This is, at least based on the current state of the evidence, a reasonable stance for Sidebotham 
to take. However, it is still possible, to offer an alternate interpretation of state activity. This 
combines the two previous scholarly positions and, as a result, offers a more nuanced 
understanding of state involvement that was crucial for creating an environment that permitted 
Roman trade in the Indian Ocean to continue and even, to flourish. 
 
Approach, Scope and Aim of the Thesis  
It has been acknowledged that no known or available evidence proves, one way or the other, 
that the Roman state proactively promoted the growth of the Red Sea branch of the Indian 
Ocean trade which fell in its orbit.12 Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that the state had 
a substantial motivation for ensuring at least the stable continuation of commercial activity. 
This thesis will not, therefore, undertake an insightful but retrospective examination of the 
efforts of the Roman state to stabilise and potentially to expand Mediterranean trade with the 
Indian Ocean. Similarly, it will not endeavour to discuss state involvement exclusively in terms 
of proactivity versus reactivity. Indeed, it will be seen throughout that understanding state 
involvement exclusively through one or other of these terms is potentially reductive. Instead, 
this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that measures which the state gradually expanded or put 
in place (such as increased security) were often introduced in reaction to a change in the 
situation but were likely implemented to proactively ensure something in the future. This future 
something and the reason for the state to implement or expand any such measures, it will be 
demonstrated below, is correctly observed to have been the potential to acquire immense 
quantities of revenue for the imperial fiscus (treasury) from Indian Ocean commerce. The 
Roman state appears to have appreciated this situation shortly after conquering Egypt.13 This 
 
11 Fitzpatrick, 2011, p.52. Nappo, 2009, p.71-75 demonstrates that similar Roman activity was undertaken from 
the 4th century AD. This makes Nappo’s proposition more likely. Nappo, 2015a, p.71 explicitly recognises that 
Rome sought to ‘control if not directly rule the Red Sea.’  
12 Gregoratti, 2018, p.52-72 has sought to consider the role that Parthia played in the Indian Ocean trade and the 
importance of the southern Mesopotamian ports and Seland, 2011, p.398-406 has even argued that the India to 
Persian Gulf route was significantly faster than the Red Sea equivalent.   
13 Aside from Strab.2.5.12 implying that trade had increased dramatically by the end of the 1st century Gates-
Foster, 2012a, p.200 notes an increase in site usage in the Eastern Desert at the same time. This certainly implies 
that the Roman state acted quickly to assert itself over economic activity in a region which had been largely 
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revenue was obtained via a series of taxes, the most important of which was the tetarte, a 25% 
import tax on all of the Indian Ocean goods which entered Roman territory.14 It is also possible, 
as Strabo suggests, that a double duty (τέλη διπλάσια) was in place and a second tetarte (also 
25%) was levied on Indian Ocean goods as they left Egypt.15   
 
Taking a desire to continuously collect this lucrative tax as the rationale for state action the 
scope of this thesis will examine those aspects of state involvement that were often 
implemented reactively but can reasonably be asserted to have been employed to proactively 
ensure the future collection of this revenue. That the Roman state knew to put in place measures 
to achieve their goal of exploiting the large revenue potential of the Indian Ocean trade could 
have come from accessing Ptolemaic information once their forces had arrived in Alexandria.16 
Indeed, it is possible that with the tetarte Rome was reinstating a Ptolemaic precedent with the 
earlier administration being estimated to have taxed the Indian Ocean trade at between 25 and 
50%.17 To this end Chapters, I and II will outline the scale of Rome’s military deployment in 
the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea and the efforts that were made to provide security in the 
region. Chapter III will then examine how and by whom potable water was made available in 
a desert environment and, finally, Chapter IV considers the management of these and other 
activities by state officials who reported to higher levels of Rome’s central government. 
Consequently, the purpose of this thesis will not be an explicit attempt to contribute to the 
debate on Roman policy in the Red Sea. Instead, it aims to better understand the nature and 
mechanisms of state interaction with an area of the Roman economy in which the state appears 
to have been involved to an unusually high degree. The result will, it is hoped, provide a fresh 
perspective on the economic capabilities of the Roman state during the imperial period which 
is sometimes seen as being strictly limited to overseeing coinage, guaranteeing grain rations 
 
isolated from state control since the Great Revolt (207-186 BC). On this time see Gates-Foster, 2012a, p.199-
203.   
14 Rathbone, 2000, p.49; Young, 2001, p. 52; 66-69; Wilson, 2015, p.22-24. 
15 De Romanis, 2020, p.123-133; Strab.17.1.3.   
16 This is not to suggest that Rome was unaware of the Indian Ocean trade before this. Indeed, Plin.NH.9.123. 
shows that low grade pearls were known in Rome by the time of Sulla (138-78 BC) and Cobb, 2018c, p.538 
notes that peppercorns from the Republican era have been found in the so-called ‘House of Heracles Wedding’ 
in Pompeii.  
17 Sidebotham, 2011, p.34. De Romanis, 2020, p.133 argues that the tetarte was a Ptolemaic legacy. Indeed, SB 
3.7176; 6.9090; 6.9416; O. Cair. 20 show that unguents were taxed at 25% throughout the 3rd century BC. 
Whittaker, 2004, p.163; 167 and McLaughlin, 2010, p.26 has argued that during the Ptolemaic period the royal 
family held a monopoly over the Indian Ocean trade. This suggestion has since been disputed by Bowman, 
2010, p.104; Sidebotham, 2011, p.34; Cobb, 2018b, p.47. That the Roman state needed to assert its authority 
over the trade is indicated by the earlier Ptolemaic loss of control during the time of the Great Revolt (207 to 
186 BC) during which time Gates-Foster, 2012a, p.200-202 observes that trade continued without the 
involvement of the central state in Alexandria.    
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for the populace of Rome itself, ensuring supplies for the army and intervening in economic 
affairs only in extreme circumstances.18 However, it is also hoped that, by discussing a 
comparatively well-documented area of economic activity in provincial Egypt, a region that 
held a special administrative status within the empire, that the results can also raise new 
questions about state economic practice across the wider span of the imperium romanum.19           
   
The Roman State and Indian Ocean Trade Revenue  
The economic potential of the Indian Ocean trade for Rome’s fiscus has already been 
observed.20 It was also established that this was due to the 25% import tax on Indian Ocean 
goods travelling through the Red Sea ports and possibly a further 25% tax as these goods left 
Egypt. Moreover, the Muziris papyrus, a copy of a ship’s loan dating to the 2nd century AD 
indicates that the resultant tax take on one ship’s cargo equated to at least two if not four million 
sesterces.21 For Evers, this factor alone constitutes a suitable reason to re-evaluate state 
involvement in the Indian Ocean trade.22 Considering therefore that the Roman state could, 
undoubtedly, acquire extensive revenue from taxing the Indian Ocean trade the suggestion that 
this constituted the primary motivator for state involvement seems beyond doubt.23 On the 
other hand, it is unclear exactly how much tax revenue the tetarte raised in a single year. As a 
result, various estimates have been proposed. These have ranged from Young’s suggestion that 
the tetarte was worth a modest 25 to 50 million sesterces per year to the Roman state to 
McLaughlin’s proposal that the Indian Ocean trade returned 270 million sesterces. This, 
McLaughlin suggests, paid for approximately one-third of the Roman army.24 Additional 
 
18 Lo Cascio, 2008, p.626-629 has argued that the state was the driving force behind the monetization of the 
empire and Bowman, 2017, p.29 lists control of the currency as one means by which the Roman state could 
influence economic behaviour within its borders. Tchernia, 2016, p.97-98; Plin.NH.13.89 states that during the 
reign of Tiberius action was taken in Rome to preserve supplies of papyri.  
19 On the special status of Egypt see Appendix I. Morley, 2009, p.115-116 has expressed scepticism that the 
evidence from Egypt is representative of the rest of the empire. For discussions of the available evidence see 
Young, 2001, p.5-14; Cobb, 2018b, p.18-27. 
20 Young, 2001, p.69; Wilson, 2015, p.22. 
21 P. Vindob.G.40822. Wilson, 2015, p.23. De Romanis, 2020, p.318 assumes that 43.75% of the Hermapollon’s 
cargo was taken in tax. This equated to 4 million sesterces. De Romanis bases this assessment on Strabo’s claim 
(17.1.3) that ‘double duties’ were in place on the Indian Ocean trade.   
22 Evers, 2017, p.111.  
23 It is also very likely that the increasing societal demand for goods from the Indian Ocean was also a motivator 
for the state to take a hand in ensuring that trade continued. This may be seen clearly in the case of pearls which 
Schneider, 2018, p.139-144 convincingly shows went from being a little-known commodity to one which was 
desperately sought after in Roman society.     
24 Young, 2001, p.210; Mclaughlin, 2010, p.164. However, McLaughlin, 2014, p.19 suggests that the Indian 
Ocean trade returned 250 million sesterces in taxes while McLaughlin, 2019, p.125 returns to the estimate of 
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suggestions by Speidel, Wilson and Bowman places the value of the tetarte on a similar order 
of magnitude.25 However, these estimates rely on combining several strands of evidence. These 
include figures for the cost of the trade stated by Pliny the Elder, the number of ships sailing 
from Myos Hormos cited by Strabo and the amount of tax, which was levied on the 
Hermapollon, the ship referenced in the Muziris papyrus.26  
Due to the diverse nature and range of these sources, the estimates which they have been used 
to create have rightly been challenged. These have included highlighting the moral context of 
Pliny’s figures, questioning the assumed typicality of ships like the Hermapollon and 
questioning the very rounded number of vessels supplied by Strabo.27 Regardless of the exact 
year-to-year value of the Indian Ocean trade to the Roman state that it was economically 
lucrative is made clear by the Muziris papyrus. Moreover, archaeological evidence, literary 
references by contemporaries and numismatic finds confirm that the trade between Egypt and 
other regions of the Indian Ocean was conducted on a very large scale.28 This would certainly, 
therefore, have guaranteed tens if not hundreds of millions of sesterces in revenue for the 
Roman state each year at least until a decline in the 3rd century AD.29 Furthermore, while Indian 
Ocean goods came to be a valuable social currency within Roman society this revenue, as 




270 million sesterces. McLaughlin, 2015, p.199-200; 204 suggests that the tetarte raised an additional 90 
million from trade passing through Syria.    
25 Speidel, 2015, p.105; Wilson, 2015, p.23; Wilson and Bowman, 2017, p.15. Scheidel, 2015, p.160 has 
estimated that the Indian Ocean trade could have raised 119 million sesterces per year and Seland, 2008, p.74 
places the value around 100 million sesterces. Most recently, while De Romanis, 2020, p.318 has calculated that 
taxes from the Indian Ocean trade could have been worth 500 million sesterces per year he cautions against 
making such estimates.  
26 Plin.NH.6.10; .12.84; Strab.2.5.12; P. Vindob.G.40822. 
27 Fitzpatrick 2011, p.31-32; Cobb, 2015a, p.191; Sealand, 2014, p.386; Parker, 2008, p.183-184; 187; Tomber, 
2008, p.31; Young, 2001, p.182; Mclaughlin, 2010, p.160; Cobb, 2018a, p.46-47; De Romanis, 2020, p.126; 
254. 
28 Cobb, 2015b, 372-378; 381. Appicius.1.1 shows that spices from the Indian Ocean were used in wine Mart. 
EP.1.87 indicates that malabathrum could be used to freshen breath and Pliny.NH.12.41.83 states that large 
amounts of incense were used for funerals across the empire. From an Indian perspective Tomber, 2013, p.116 
notes that approximately 6,000 Roman pottery sherds have been found just at Pattanam (ancient Muzris).      
29 Nappo, 2007, p.237-238; McLaughlin, 2010, p.59-60. Tomber, 2013, p.114; 2017, p.531 has argued that 





The Size of the Roman Military Deployment in the 
Eastern Desert and the Red Sea 
 
…the region was militarily important, and, in order to prevent 
incursions from nomadic tribes, there was a constant, if limited, 
military presence.30 
 
As the quote from Adams suggests, a common feature of any study of the involvement of the 
Roman state in the Indian Ocean trade, and the most visible example of reactive action taken 
by the state to proactively ensure the collection of revenue are the military forces which were 
stationed in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea.31 These soldiers garrisoned praesidia (small 
forts) that lined the roads to the ports, guarded the quarries, acted as marines on naval vessels 
in the Red Sea and manned bases on distant islands, conducted small campaigns and prevented 
smuggling.32 All of these tasks were crucial both for Rome’s Indian Ocean trade and other 
economic activities that were conducted in the region. On the other hand, despite recognising 
the military’s importance relatively few studies have discussed the number of troops that were 
involved in any detail.33 As the opening quote for this chapter shows, some, such as Adams 
believe that the size of Rome’s military presence in the area was limited although he does not 
say if this was limited in terms of Egypt’s provincial forces or those of the wider empire.34 On 
the other hand, while Maxfield has simply argued that a large number of soldiers were sent to 
the Eastern Desert Sidebotham has since suggested that as many as 1,000 men were stationed 
in and around the Red Sea port of Berenike by the end of the 2nd century AD.35 Similarly, Van 
 
30 Adams, 2007, p.197.  
31 Young, 2001, p.69-74; Cobb, 2018b, p.108-112; 116-120; Maxfield, 2003, p.154; Adams, 2007, p.197; Hirt, 
2010, p.180-182; Nappo, 2009, p.65-66; Speidel, 2015, p.89-93; Sidebotham, 2011, p.165.     
32 For the campaign of Aelius Gallus see Sidebotham, 1986, p.122-123; Speidel, 2015, p.97-99. On the garrisons 
in the Eastern Desert consult Young, 2001, p.69-74; Cobb, 2018b, p.111; 2019, p.89-90. Symonds, 2017, p.2.    
33 Maxfield, 2000, p.402-442 seems to be one of the few specifically on this topic but even then, only goes so far 
as to suggest that many soldiers were involved. However, it should be noted that this article was published prior 
to the discovery of subsequent material.    
34 Adams, 2007, p.197.  
35 Maxfield, 2000, p.409; Sidebotham, 2011, p.260. 
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der Veen, Bouchard, Cappers and Newton propose that between 500 and 900 men manned the 
praesidia and De Romanis has drawn attention to an inscription which mentions that 1,400 
soldiers were used to construct wells.36 If accurate this would have represented 10% percent of 
the military garrison of provincial Egypt during the time of Augustus and as much as 20% by 
the start of the 2nd century AD.37 Speidel and Sidebotham have, moreover, drawn attention to 
additional units of cavalry and archers that were stationed at Coptos, the gateway to the Eastern 
Desert.38 This could have dramatically increased this percentage.   
However, these estimates do not account for the soldiers of the navy nor those that guarded the 
mines or were posted overseas. Given the importance of these duties, these troops must be 
added to an estimate of the size of Rome’s state forces in the region. This chapter will, 
therefore, re-evaluate the size of the Roman deployment in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea. 
It will first consider the issues presented by an attempt to assess the number of soldiers that 
were present and establish a suitable methodology. Following this, this chapter will 
sequentially establish the number of soldiers that were assigned to the praesidia, quarries, 
mines, ports, navy, the Leuke Kome customs-post and the Farasan Islands. Finally, some 
thought will be given to those units which Sidebothm and Speidel indicate were posted outside 
of the desert itself. Although this discussion, in and of itself, will indicate the level of support 
which the Roman state provided to the Indian Ocean trade and related activities it will help to 
contextualise the extent to which the state (via the military) could have actively enforced any 
measures that were intended to proactively secure revenue. These included the provision of 
security and the management and control of the water supply.39 Additionally, as will be seen, 
the number of soldiers involved would increase over time. This shows that reactive action taken 




36 Van der Veen et al, 2018, p.359; De Romanis, 2020, p.51; ILS 2483. De Romanis, 2020, f.75 suggests that 
these troops were repurposed members of the Galatian army. Haynes, 2013, p.271-272 has argued that the 
difference between citizen legions and non-citizen auxilia became increasingly anachronistic.   
37 Pollard, 2004, p.211; Fischer-Bovet and Sänger, 2019, p.172; Tac.Ann.4.5; BGU I 140. For a detailed 
breakdown see Appendix III.   
38 Sidebotham, 2011, p.260; Speidel, 1984, p.221.  
39 See Chapter II on the issue of protection and security and Chapter III for a discussion of water management.   
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Calculating the Military Deployment     
Previous studies have identified several methods for calculating the number of soldiers that 
were based in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea. The first of these uses records of the amount 
of food that was delivered to the garrisons of the praesidia. Since soldiers during the imperial 
period had a fixed monthly grain ration this has enabled Adams to deduce that 215 soldiers 
garrisoned a single praesidium.40 A second approach which has been outlined by Sidebotham, 
Hense and Nouwens attempts, firstly, to identify barrack buildings and, secondly, to calculate 
the number of soldiers which these buildings could have accommodated. Using this method 
Sidebotham and his co-authors propose that the praesidium of Abu sha’ r housed between 150 
and 200 soldiers.41 However, while both of these examples are individually useful several 
problems become apparent when attempting to apply these methods to a wider assessment of 
military personal. In the first instance, Adams’ method of using records of food deliveries to 
determine troop numbers, while certainly a valid approach, is curtailed by the absence of large 
quantities of such information.  
On the other hand, the approach described by Sidebotham, Hense and Nouwens initially 
appears to hold greater promise for a larger analysis. This is akin to the Shotgun Method an 
approach outlined by Hansen which is designed to estimate the minimum and the maximum 
size potential of an ancient city’s population.42 The Shotgun Method, which builds on the work 
of Beloch, relies on tracing the perimeter of a city, usually via the remains of fortified walls, 
and estimates for the size of a typical Greek household to calculate the number of people that 
could have lived within this area.43 Hansen has subsequently used this to estimate the 
population of every known polis during the Classical period.44 However, Hansen’s proposal, 
by his own admission, only offers a hypothetical series of numbers rather than a concrete figure. 
In addition to this, Wilson has highlighted that Hanson’s calculations do not account for public 
spaces within the poleis.45 Despite this Wilson expands upon Hanson’s work and Sidebotham, 
in addition to the barracks at Abu sha ‘r, similarly uses the housing district of Berenike to 
estimate (along with Wendrich) that its population numbered between 500 and 1,000 people 
during Late Antiquity.46 On the face of it therefore the archaeological approach holds more 
 
40 Adams, 1995, p.122-124; 2007, p.213-214.   
41 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.241-242. 
42 Hansen, 2006b, p.4. 
43 Hansen, 2006b, p.4; 32; 35; 2008, p.260; Beloch, 1886, p.388-443.  
44 Hansen, 2006a, P.32.  
45 Wilson, 2011, p.170-176.    
46 Sidebotham and Wendrich, 1998, p.85-96. 
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promise for calculating the number of soldiers that were deployed in the Eastern Desert and 
the Red Sea.       
However, the discovery that civilians co-habited the praesidia alongside Rome’s military 
personnel make such an approach problematic.47 This is because although enough 
archaeological material survives for Reddé to estimate that these fortifications measured, on 
average, 40 to 50 metres square he also cautions that securely identifying the buildings which 
housed soldiers is difficult due to continuous modification and restoration efforts.48 Moreover, 
while some praesidia such as Maximiaon are exceptionally well-preserved this is not always 
the case.49 This makes recognising military buildings even more difficult. Indeed, identifying 
these buildings at Berenike is limited by the fact that only two percent of the site has been 
excavated.50 Thus, considering this and the fact that these spaces were shared with civilians, 
attempting to identify barrack-like buildings in all but isolated cases is not currently a suitable 
method to determine the number of soldiers in the entire region.     
In contrast, the methodology outlined by Van der Veen, Bouchaurd, Cappers and Newton sits 
in between the two previous approaches. This is because while it uses archaeology to determine 
how many praesidia were occupied it also utilises documents which preserve details of the size 
of their garrisons and the duty rotas that the soldiers used.51 That such documents survive is, in 
part, due to the unique preservation conditions of the Eastern Desert.52 Indeed, Egypt is, so far, 
the only region to have yielded census data from the imperial period.53 In addition to the duty 
rotas, other documents have been discovered across the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea that 
offer additional important insights into the number of troops stationed at other locations such 
as the ports, quarries and overseas. This third methodology, therefore, which mostly employs 
documentary evidence but still utilises other relevant material such as archaeology, is perhaps 
the best means of reliably assessing the number of troops in the Eastern Desert and the Red 
Sea. Furthermore, this adaptive framework will allow this study to consider the number of 
soldiers involved with the navy and other activities.     
 
 
47 Cobb, 2018b, p.96; 99; Broux, 2017, p.150-151; O. Did 377; 379; 393.  
48 Reddé, 2018, p.194. 
49 Reddé, 2018, p.182. 
50 Sidebotham, 2011, p. 222; Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.199; Tomber 2008, p.24; Cobb, 2015a, p.363-390.  
51 Van der Veen et al, 2018, p.359. 
52 Sidebotham, 2011, p.79; Adams, 2007, p.197-198; Tomber 2008, p.24; 54-55; Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.312.  
53 Wilson, 2011, p.170. 
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The praesidia     
It has already been established that the method which Van der Veen, Bouchard, Cappers and 
Newton have used to suggest that 500 to 900 men were stationed in the praesidia is promising. 
Indeed, Sidebotham suggests a similar number based on the discovery of an inscription found 
in Berenike which references a chiliarch (‘commander of one thousand).’54 This suggests that 
the proposed figure of 900 men manning the praesidia is potentially accurate. Van der Veen, 
Bouchard, Cappers and Newton’s figure is based off the surviving duty rotas of these garrisons 
which, they suggest, numbered on average between 15 and 30 men. This figure probably 
included the two to four men which other documents show were involved in manning the 
skopoloi (watchtowers).55 Furthermore, they propose that these troops were based in 30 
separate praesidia spread across the Eastern Desert. These garrisons, moreover, seem to have 
often been comprised of a mixture of small units of infantry and cavalry.56 Conversely, despite 
this comparatively reliable information how Van der Veen, Bouchard, Cappers and Newton 
calculated the number of praesidia that were actively garrisoned is not addressed. 
A network of roads and forts stretching from the Nile Valley to the Red Sea coast appears to 
have been established during the 3rd century BC as part of infrastructural efforts by Ptolemy II. 
This was intended to be used by parties of hunters that were dispatched in search of elephants 
for use in Ptolemaic military expeditions.57 However, the network of fortifications which was 
constructed seems to have been far smaller than the one which supported activity during the 
imperial Roman period.58 These installations were also smaller and less uniform in shape than 
their later counterparts with the largest of these at Wadi Abu Greiya being remodelled 
following Augustus’ conquest.59 Even then, the Roman praesidia did not adhere to a single 
floor plan and were heavily modified.60 Despite the detailed excavation of some praesidia, 
Sidebotham cautions that not all have been subjected to such examinations. This makes the 
dates at which these locations were occupied difficult to determine.61 Moreover, while Brun’s 
recent study has charted the chronology of the praesidia leading to Myos Hormos and Berenike 
he only gives an overview of their development and does not offer any precise dates for 
 
54 Sidebotham, 2011, p.260; Dijkstra and Verhoogt, 1999, p.208-218. 
55 Cobb, 2015a, p.377; Young, 2001, p.70; Zitterkopf and Sidebotham, 1989 p.183; O. Amst.14-18.   
56 Cuvigny, 2006a, p.307–310; K242; O. Krok. 1. 
57 Cobb, 2018a, p.29-32; Burstein, 1996, p.802; Charles, 2007, p.306-311; Sidebotham, 2011, p.29-31; Agath.1; 
Strab. 2.3.4; 17.1.25; 45 Pliny NH 6.33.167; 168; Strabo 16.4.4–5; Pithom Stele line 23. 
58 Sidebotham, 2011, p.143. Note also that the term praesidia is Roman rather than Ptolemaic.  
59 Sidebotham, 2011, p.143.  
60 Reddé, 2018, p.184; 206 Sidebotham, 2011, p.162-163.  
61 Sidebotham, 2011, p.150.  
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occupation.62 This situation is further complicated by disagreements in the literary sources over 
the number of praesidia on certain roads.  
In the case of the Coptos to Berenike road, Pliny states that there were eight stations while the 
Antonine itinerary and the so-called Peutinger table suggest that 10 were placed at intervals 
along the road.63 While it could be that the Peutinger table is referring to praesidia that were 
constructed after Pliny’s account other surveys have revealed an otherwise unknown 
praesidium on the same route. However, given the Hellenistic nature of the finds it likely had 
its origins within the Ptolemaic period.64 Sidebotham, Zitterkopf, Peacock and Van der Veen 
initially believed that most of the praesidia were constructed and occupied under the Julio-
Claudian dynasty.65 However, this assertion was based on the results of earlier surveys of 
surface material along with ostraca and graffiti which date to the 1st century AD.66 On the other 
hand, the work of the l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale (IFAO) has demonstrated that 
the praesidia underwent a major period of construction and refortification under the Flavians.67 
These efforts likely represented a reaction to a significant change of circumstances. Cuvigny 
and Brun, based on the comments of Strabo and the evidence for a major phase of building 
activity from the late 1st and into the 2nd century AD, suggest this indicates that formerly 
unfortified lakkoi (cisterns) were replaced by fortified praesidia.68 The increase in fortifications 
during this period was likely part of a state response to a rising number of attacks by the 
barbaroi in an attempt to proactively defend the desert roads.69  
That more of the praesidia were active from the start of the 2nd century AD onwards is 
confirmed by Sidebotham in his 2011 volume. This monograph utilises decades of additional 
archaeological data from subsequent expeditions and has allowed Sidebotham to modify the 
view outlined in his earlier 1986 work.70 Using this enlarged data-set pottery sherds allow some 
39 praesidia to be identified as having been active from the 2nd century AD onwards.71 This 
confirms Van der Veen, Bouchard, Cappers and Newton’s estimate and represents almost half 
 
62 See Brun, 2018, p.141-173.   
63 Cobb, 2018b, p.101; 103; Plin.NH.6.102-103.   
64 Sidebotham, 1999, p.364; Cobb, 2018a, p.101.  
65 Sidebotham, 1986, p.54; 2011, p.154; Sidebotham and Zitterkopf, 1989, p.165; Peacock, 2000, p.426; Van der 
Veen, 2011, p.8.  
66 Young, 2001, p.41; Cobb, 2019, p.98; I. Pan 87; I. Koptos 3; 38-39; 40-49.  
67 Cobb, 2019, p.102-105; 2019, p.98-100; Reddé and Brun, 2006, p.86; 90-91; 94; 98-99; 126; 137; Brun, 
2006a, p.187; 200; Cuvigny, 2006b, 267-273.  
68 Cuvigny, 2006b, p.267-273; 2006b, p.253-257; Brun, 2006a, p.196; Cobb, 2015a, p.378; ILS 2483; I. Pan 68; 
I. Did.1; I. Did.2; Strab.17.1.53.  
69 Schneider, 2014, p.11; Cobb, 2019, p.100-103. On state efforts to provide security see Chapter III.  
70 Sidebotham, 1986, p.54; 2011, p.129-135.  
71 Sidebotham, 2011, p.129-135. 
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of the c.80 praesidia and stations which appear to have been occupied between the Pharaonic 
era and the Islamic periods in the territory to the east of the Nile.72 Thus, to calculate the number 
of troops deployed in the praesidia it seems best to include only those sites which the 
archaeology suggests were inhabited from the 2nd century AD. This is firstly because it matches 
the chronology of the surviving rotas and because it avoids basing any, already inherently 
hypothetical, estimates on limited and conflicting literary evidence.73 Using pottery to date the 
periods of occupation Sidebotham, as noted above, lists some 39 forts which were active during 
the 2nd century AD with some of these remaining in use until the 7th century AD.74  
When this is combined with the troop rotas a minimum estimate for the number of soldiers 
manning the praesidia, based on 39 garrisons of c.15 soldiers per praesidium produces a figure 
of c.585 men.75 In contrast, a maximum estimate based on garrisons of 24 soldiers per 
praesidium would mean that c.936 soldiers garrisoned the praesidia.76 While Sidebotham, 
Adams, Maxfield, McLaughlin and Cobb have pointed out that the number of soldiers at each 
praesidium were not uniform both of these estimates align with those of Van der Veen, 
Bouchard, Cappers and Newton.77 However, to account for the potential variations in the 
number of troops deployed to the praesidia it seems sensible to suggest an average garrison of 
c.20 men per praesidium. This gives an estimate of c.780 men manning the praesidia, on 
average, during the 2nd century AD. Despite being smaller than the upper estimate suggested 
by Van der Veen, Bouchard, Cappers and Newton their larger estimate may be more 
representative of the number of troops in the whole of the region. That this is likely the case is 
indicated, as was noted, by the inscription from Berenike referencing a chiliarch, an officer 
notionally in command of 1,000 soldiers. However, to reach this number it is necessary to 




72 Sidebotham, 2011, p.163  
73 Cobb, 2018b, p.95-96; 101; 103; M920.  
74 Sidebotham, 2011, p.129-135. Sidebotham, 2011, p.150 also suggests that there was a peak in the number of 
troops in the Eastern Desert during the first half of the 2nd century AD.  
75 Sidebotham, 2011, p.166; Cuvigny, 2005, p.3; 179; no.117. This ostracon indicates that 11-15 men were 
garrisoned at Krokodilo in 109 AD.  
76 Cobb, 2015a, p.377. See Sidebotham, 2011, p.166 for a summary of the evidence for the size of Roman 
garrisons prior to the discovery of duty rotas.  
77 Sidebotham, 2011, p.150; McLaughlin, 2010, p.32; Adams, 2007, p.197; Maxfield, 2003, p.160-163. M920 
shows that 15 men were based at Maximianon 18 were stationed at Persou and 15 more at Simiou.    
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The Quarries and Mines  
Obtaining gold ore was a primary focus for Ptolemaic mining operations in the Eastern Desert 
with metallurgical analysis demonstrating that gold from this area was used in the coin series 
of at least two of the dynasty’s monarchs.78 By the Roman period, however, while gold mining 
had declined the extraction of other minerals had expanded and c.130 locations have now been 
identified as having been exploited to various degrees.79 Where some of these sites continued 
to mine for gold and others for precious minerals many of the newer sites were dedicated to 
quarrying rare and valuable types of stone.80 Amongst these, the quarries of Mons Claudianus 
and Mons Porphyrites stand out, both for their size and sophistication, with Mons Claudianus 
possessing its own medical unit.81 These locations appear to have operated intermittently 
between the 1st and the 3rd century AD and the 1st and the 5th century AD respectively.82 The 
importance of Mons Claudianus and Mons Porphyrites stem, moreover, from their role as 
sources of ‘imperial’ purple porphyry, as well as black porphyry, hard granodiorite and 
tonalite.83 These are all valuable types of stone that were used in fine sculpture, monumental 
buildings and the villa of Emperor Hadrian.84 Such valuable materials seem to have 
necessitated military protection and, as a result, both Mons Claudianus and Porphyrites were 
established around fortified outposts and several praesidia seem to have also been situated 
nearby.85 This placed both these quarries and several mines within easy reach of military 
support.   
 Aside from protecting valuable resources, a further potential need for soldiers to be posted 
close to these sites comes from an account by Diodorus of the Ptolemies hiring a contingent of 
mercenaries to oversee convicted criminals that worked in the mines. This well-known story 
has led some to question the status of the labourers in the Eastern Desert during the Roman 
period.86 In supporting the view that Rome’s labours were unfree Hirt has argued that the 
 
78 Brun, 2018, p.142-145; Klemm and Klemm, 2013, p.12-15; Fuacher, 2018, p.61-62; Gates-Foster, 2012a, 
p.194-195.   
79 Klemm and Kelmm, 2013, p.15; Hirt, 2011, p.184; Maxfield, 2002, p.155. Maxfield, 2002, p.143 identifies 70 
quarry sites that were active at different times.   
80 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.74; 78; 82-83; Reddé, 2018, p.183.  
81 Hirt, 2011, p.183; Le Bohec 1994: 52; O. Claud. 120; O. Claud. inv. 1538+2921, 2055, 2795+3739, 3260. 
82 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.72; 77. For a discussion of when the major quarries were established see Maxfield, 
2002, p.148.  Cuvigny, 2014, p.166 argues that Mons Claudianus was active from the time of Claudius or Nero 
until the time of Severus Alexander. In contrast, she suggests that Mons Porphyrites was opened under 
Domitian, quickly abandoned, and then briefly reoccupied under Antonius Pius.  
83 Maxfield, 2002, p.143; Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.74; 78; 82-83. 
84 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.74; 78; 82-83; Tomber, 2013, p.112; 2018, p.531.  
85 Hirt, 2011, p.179; 185; Tomber, 2013, p.112-113.  
86 Diod.3.12; Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.220-22.     
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soldiers stationed at Smitthus were there to guard convicted workers.87 While several later 
sources do mention the use of unfree labourers in the Eastern Desert the notion of using 
exclusively slave labour during the imperial period has, in contrast to Hirt, rightly been 
questioned.88 This is a result of recent evidence indicating that many workers were free 
labourers who received a substantial food ration and a monetary wage which was 
comparatively good for labourers in the Roman Empire.89 Thus, while soldiers were likely not 
needed to guard convicted labourers, contingents such as those at Smitthus would have been 
required instead to provide security to workers at the mines and quarries. This was due to the 
value of the extracted materials and the increasing threat of attacks by the barbaroi.90  
While it is clear therefore that many soldiers would have been involved in guarding Rome’s 
mines and quarries in the Eastern Desert it is uncertain how many were assigned to this duty. 
It has already been observed that many sites could likely draw on soldiers from a nearby 
praesidium. On the other hand, sites such as Smitthus evidently maintained garrisons.91 
However, it is only at Mons Claudianus that the exact size of the garrison can be deduced from 
documents recording the provision of drinking water to the inhabitants of the quarry.92 Since 
the soldiers are listed first it can be calculated that of the c.900 inhabitants of Mons Claudianus 
the garrison was comprised of 2 officers, 30 infantry, 6 cavalry and 22 recruits.93 Perhaps due 
to Mons Claudianus being based around a fortified settlement, this was, therefore, a far larger 
garrison than those which were sent to the praesidia.94 This difference has been explained by 
Hirt as the result of the increased responsibilities of the soldiers at Mons Claudianus.95 This 
appears to have included running the medical facility and overseeing the operation of the quarry 
itself.96 Indeed, Rome’s imperial quarries were frequently managed by members of the 
 
87 Hirt, 2011, p.185. Maxfield, 2002, p.154 sees it as possible that the workers may have been slaves but sees 
this as unlikely. For a similar view see Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.220-221.   
88 Maxfield, 2002, p.154; Aelius.36; 67; Eusebius, de Martyribus Palistinae. 8.1.  
89 Maxfield, 2002, p.154; Van der Veen et al, 2018, p.360. Cuvigny, 1996, p.140-141 shows that workers could 
be paid half as much as members of the military.  
90 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.216 has suggested that guarding gold mines would have been a major concern. 
Cobb, forthcoming, has highlighted several ostraca from Mons Claudianus that suggest that the threat of the 
barbaroi did disrupt work O. Claud. Inv. 4888; 7309; 7226; 7255; 4.851; O. Ka. La. inv.31; P. Bagnall 8.   
91 Hirt, 2011, p.185.  
92 Hirt, 2011, p.182; Sidebotham, 2011, p.89; Bülow-Jacobsen, 2018, p.17; O. Claud.inv.1538+2921. While this 
ostracon dates to the 1st century AD it is unlikely that the number of soldiers at the site declined during the 2nd 
century AD.  
93 Hirt, 2011, p.182; Sidebotham, 2011, p.89; Bülow-Jacobsen, 2018, p.17; O. Claud.inv.1538+2921. 
94 Tomber, 2013, p.112-113. 
95 Hirt, 2011, p.183. Maxfield, 2002, p.151 similarly proposes that the quarry garrisons were there to offer 
protection and to administer the site 
96 Hirt, 2011, p.169-171; 183; 201. For centurions at Mons Claudianus see I. Pan 21; 38; 39; 41; 42; O. Claud. 
48. For centurions at sites across the Empire see App. no. 618; CIL III 12286.   
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military.97 Nevertheless, despite the size and importance of Mons Claudianus’ garrison 
Smitthus, which has yielded several inscriptions concerning soldiers, has yet to provide 
evidence for the size of its garrison.98  
As a result, not only are the size of the garrisons of these other sites unknown it is also unknown 
how many there were. Sidebotham, Hense and Nouwens have attributed this to the limited 
excavation of sites such as gold mines which would have been in special need of protection.99  
Indeed, the evidence for the size of garrisons at quarries and mines across the Roman Empire 
offers little assistance for inferring answers to these questions. This is because the number of 
soldiers placed at mines and quarries seems to have varied widely with the garrison at Montana 
in Moesia seemingly fluctuating from between 100 and 500 men.100 It seems, therefore, that 
while many of the mines and quarries of the Eastern Desert had a praesidium nearby and others 
had garrisons only Mons Claudianus provides clear evidence for its size. Despite this, Mons 
Claudianus’ garrison of c.60 men, similarly to the praesidia, and the contingent at Montana 
may have fluctuated throughout the year.101 Furthermore, while it would not have been possible 
for the Roman state to provide all 130 mines and quarries with this many soldiers the need to 
distribute troops to protect other sites may, to some degree, account for the large garrison at 
Mons Claudianus.102 Thus it is possible to add at least 60 soldiers to our estimate for the number 
of troops deployed to the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea although it is probable that more were 
involved with this sector of activity. 
 
The Red Sea Ports  
Alongside establishing many of the forts (στρατόπεδα) that would later become Roman 
praesidia Ptolemy II also constructed several ports (λιμένες) to receive shipments of elephants 
from hunting parties that were dispatched further down the coast of the Red Sea.103 As well as 
receiving elephants these ports also built the specialist vessels called elephantagoi that 
 
97 Hirt, 2011, p.177; P. Mich. 465; 466.   
98 Hirt, 2011, p.184-185; AE 1992 1820; 1821; 1823.  
99 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.222.  
100 Hirt, 2011, p.189; 192; CIL III 12529; AE 1987: 867. 
101 Maxfield, 2002, p.157 suggests that quarry work was done throughout the year but that the intensity would 
have varied due to need and the number of ongoing imperial projects.  
102 Klemm and Klemm, 2013, p.616 argue that the only way that all the mines could be protected was with the 
support of the praesidia garrisons.  
103 Casson, 1993, p.247-260; Charles, 2007, p.53-65; Burstein, 1996, p.799-807; Manning, 2011; p.296-318; 
Cobb, 2016, p.192-204; Strab.17.1.25; 1.45; Plin.NH.6.33.167. 
168; Strab.16.4.4–5; Pithom Stele, line 23.  
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transported them.104 Although the Ptolemies are believed to have founded 12 ports along the 
Red Sea shore only Berenike continued to operate as receptacles of the elephant trade. This 
location along with Myos Hormos subsequently acted as the central hubs for both Ptolemaic 
and Roman trading ventures into the Indian Ocean.105 By the end of the 1st century BC Strabo 
suggests that an immense volume of goods was being traded just through the port of Myos 
Hormos when he states that: 
 
 
 I [Strabo] was with Gallus at the time he was prefect of Egypt and 
accompanied him as far as Syene and the frontiers of Ethiopia, and I 
found that about one hundred and twenty ships sail from Myos Hormos 
to India.106  
 
 
Although no similar statement survives for the scale of goods passing through Berenike, the 
discovery of a jar in the forecourt of the so-called ‘Great Temple’ which contained seven 
kilograms of black pepper indicates that Berenike also processed a large amount of trade.107 In 
addition to this, the importance of Berenike is indicated by the fact that it served as the seat of 
the Prefect of Berenike. This was arguably the foremost Roman official in the Eastern 
Desert.108 Given the presence of this official and due to the amount of trade moving through 
Berenike it, therefore, seems reasonable, as Sidebotham has suggested, for the city to have had 
a garrison.109 However, while a rubbish dump to the north of the city has disgorged documents 
that reference the delivery of water to military units within Berenike, alongside the so-called 
Nicanor Archive, none of these has confirmed the presence of a permeant military garrison.110 
Instead, Sidebotham observes that 10 praesidia were constructed to encircle Berenike in a 
defensive ring.111 This he rightly suggests assumedly had the dual function of protecting the 
 
104 Sidbotham, 2011, p.48; P. Petrie II 40a; Diod.3.40.4; Agath.5.85.   
105 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.158-176; Tomber, 2017, 537-539; Cobb, 2018a, p.29-30; Tomber, 2008, p.57-65; 
Sidebotham, 2011, p.1.  
106 Strab.2.5.12, translation Jones 1897.    
107 Sealand 2014: 382; De Romanis 2012: 78.  
108 On the status and duties of the Prefect of Berenike see Chapter IV.   
109 Sidebotham, 2011, p.68-69.  
110 McLaughlin, 2014, p.80; Tomber, 2008, p.24-25. See also Bagnall, Helms and Verhooght, 2000; 2005a and 
2005b for collections of ostraca recovered from excavations in Berenike. For examples of deliveries of water to 
soldiers in Berenike see Bagnall and Ast, 2016, nos.265; 274; 257; 276; 277; 278; 279; 280.      
111 Sidebotham, 2011, p.66.  
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city and providing it with water.112 Nonetheless, in addition to these outlying units, the Prefect 
of Berenike could probably draw on military personal based within the city itself.  
 
These presumably came from a small personal retinue attached to the Prefect and any troops 
which had potentially been provided to act as an escort from an outlaying praesidium.113 
Moreover, these troops could well have also been supplemented by hiring any of the doubtless 
scores of mercenaries which it might be inferred from the Coptos Tariff and the Muziris 
papyrus would have gathered in the Red Sea ports to escort merchants returning to the Nile 
Valley.114 Since the Prefect of Berenike appears to have commanded the Ala Heracliana it is 
not unlikely, similarly to the retinues of Rome’s provincial governors, that a small number of 
these soldiers would always have accompanied the Prefect.115 That this was perhaps a small 
number of soldiers is, as Fuhruhman highlights, because soldiers were in short supply and high 
demand for provincial duties during the Imperial period. Indeed, even the governor of 
Macedonia is noted as only having had five soldiers in his private entourage in 165 AD.116 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that a comparable number of troops would have been 
stationed in Berenike as at Mons Claudianus, at least during the peak of the trading season. 
Indeed, this suggestion would explain the ostraca recording deliveries of water to military units 
in the city.117 Consequently, it is possible that at least 50 soldiers were present in Berenike 
during the trading season and more could have been summoned from the nearby praesidia.118 
Such a situation was, furthermore, likely the case in Myos Hormos. This would have added at 
least 100 soldiers to the total deployment in the region. On the other hand, the establishment 
of a naval force in the Red Sea, based at these ports, will have reduced the need for them to 
maintain an especially large or permanent garrison.  
 
 
112 Sidebotham, 2011, p.66.  
113 Cobb, 2018b, p.110; Cuvigny, 2005, 25, 77–82, 94, 154. For examples see K458; 315; 519a; O. Krok.87. 
114 Cobb, 2018b, p.111; OGIS 674; P. Vindob.G.40822.   
115 Sidebotham, 2011, p.260; Fuhrumman, 2011, p.190-192. AE 1967, 444, lines 32–37 suggest that retinues 
could include up to 500 men.  
116  Fuhrumman, 2011, p.184; 190-192; AE 1967, 444 lines 32–37; Plin.Ep.10.77; 78.  
117 Sidebotham, 2011, p.76; Ast and Bagnall, 2016, p.72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 275; 276; 277; 279; 280; 281.  
118 Sidebotham, 2011, p.66. 
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The Red Sea Fleet  
Aside from constructing Berenike and Myos Hormos, the Ptolemies also established the 
precedent of having a Red Sea naval force.119 This was likely to protect ships from attack by 
pirates.120 Although little is known about these earlier naval assets their primary headquarters 
was probably in the port of Berenike. That this was perhaps the case is suggested by the fact 
that Berenike was the location where the elephantagoi appear to have been constructed.121 
These ships were, by necessity, very large and were technically complex to construct, thus, 
making them very valuable and worthy of military protection.122 Indeed, the impact of losing 
just one of these ships is shown by the three-month delay required to construct a new vessel 
following a sinking during a return voyage to Berenike.123 Moreover, although Strabo suggests 
that, during Gallus’ campaign, Rome’s naval forces were based further to the north at Clysma 
and Arsinoe, Berenike seems to have resumed its historic role as the primary naval base by the 
1st century AD.124 That this was the case is shown, firstly, by an ostracon which mentions the 
captain of a trireme in the city.125 Secondly, as was noted above, Berenike’s, significance as 
the seat of the Prefect made it the logical choice for the headquarters of Rome’s Red Sea fleet. 
The final reason that Berenike was likely Rome’s foremost naval base in the Red Sea rather 
than Myos Hormos is that it was 200 nautical miles further south. This made it the closest base 
to the mouth of the Red Sea, Leuke Kome and Rome’s garrison on the Farasan Islands.126  
 
The size of Rome’s Red Sea fleet between the 1st and the 3rd century is unknown.127 Although 
Strabo states that Aelius Gallus constructed 210 ships for his military campaign at the close of 
the 1st century BC only 80 of these appear to have been military vessels with the additional 130 
being used to transport soldiers.128 The situation is further complicated by the fact that the types 
of vessels that Rome stationed in the Red Sea are largely unknown. Nonetheless, Strabo states 
that Gallus’ fleet was comprised of triremes, biremes and light ships and ostraca confirm that 
 
119 Salles, 2015, p.259; Nappo, 2017a, p.112; OGIS 132.    
120 See Chapter III. 
121 Gates-Foster, 2012a, p.199; Seland, 2009, p.180; P. Petrie II 40(a). 
122 Cobb, 2018a, p.30; Agath.5.85 a; b; Diod.3.40. Strab.2.3.4 mentions guards on the Red Sea coast. While this 
likely referred to troops manning the forts of the Ptolemaic period could well have included Berenike.   
123 Seland, 2009, p.181; P. Petrie II 40(a).   
124 Nappo, 2017a, p.115-116; Strab.16.4.23 
125 Nappo, 2009, p.60; O.Petr.296.   
126 Casson, 1980, p.22 suggests that Berenike had an advantage over Myos Hormos of being 200 nautical miles 
to the south of Berenike. On the location of Leuke Kome see PME.19.   




a diverse range of ships including triremes and a liburna were operating in the region during 
the 1st century AD.129 This makes it impossible, based on the current evidence, to determine 
with complete accuracy the number of soldiers assigned to Rome’s Red Sea fleet. Furthermore, 
while the Martyrium Arethae states that the Emperor Justinian gathered 50 ships from the Red 
Sea ports in 524 or 525 AD this does not reflect the size of Rome’s fleet of two hundred years 
earlier for several reasons.130 Firstly, it is uncertain if these were military vessels or repurposed 
merchant boats.131 Second, these ships are mentioned in connection with Justinian’s support 
for the Axumite campaign against the King of the Himyarites.132 Thus, like Gallus’ fleet in the 
1st century AD, this fleet seems to have been assembled for a specific military campaign and 
does not refer to the regular number of military vessels that were stationed in the area. 
Secondly, Justinian’s invasion force is said to have numbered c.120,000 men.133 That Gallus’ 
fleet was comprised of 130 transports for only 11,500 men implies that this later account is 
grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, Justinian gathers his ships from the Red Sea ports during 
the 6th century AD, a time when Rome’s Indian Ocean trade, while still functioning, had 
declined from the high point of the 1st century AD.  
 
It is certainly possible therefore that at least this many ships could well have been crewed 
during the imperial period. Thus, while there is no concrete evidence for the size of Rome’s 
Red Sea fleet during the Imperial period or its composition Josephus notes that 40 ships made 
up Rome’s Pontic fleet in the Black Sea.134 Since the Black Sea was a key supplier of grain it 
does not seem unreasonable to compare the Red Sea, a region through which a large and very 
valuable trade returned to Roman territory to the Black Sea.135 As a result, if Rome’s Red Sea 
fleet included at least the same number of triremes (40) then this could have represented an 
additional c.400 soldiers stationed at the Red Sea ports.136 Moreover, if 20 of these were based 
 
129 Nappo, 2009, p.61; O. Petre.279.    
130 Nappo, 2015a, p.75; Martyrium Arethae.29.  
131 De Romanis, 2020, p.68 translates Martyrium Arethae.29 as ‘merchants came from’ thus implying that the 
ships that were gathered were civilian not military vessels.   
132 Nappo, 2015a, p.75; Martyrium Arethae.29. Eide et al, 1998, p.1186 provide a discussion of a letter from 
Justinian which indicates that Byzantine assistance was motivated by the massacre of Christians by the Himyrite 
King.  
133 Martyrium Arethae.29. 
134 Jos.BJ.2.16.4 
135 Bissa, 2009, p.155.  
136 The figure of 200 men assumes that the vessels of Rome’s Red Sea fleet were all triremes. Morrison et al, 
2000, p.109; Jameson, 1960, p.199-200, lines 23-26. The so-called ‘Degree of Themistocles’ states that an 
Athenian trireme was to be crewed by 10 epibatai and 4 archers. While Saddington, 2008, p.202 notes that 
Roman classis came to use the large ships of the Hellenistic period he also observes that triremes and biremes 
remained in use. This variety is confirmed by the ostraca mentioned above.   
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at Myos Hormos and 20 at Berenike respectively then this would have provided each of the 
ports with a permeant if fluctuating garrison over 200 men.137 This could, again, explain the 
number of deliveries of water to military units in these locations. 
 
Leuke Kome  
The author of the Periplus observes that, sometime between 40 and 70 AD a centurion and a 
detachment of troops were posted (probably by the Roman state) to Leuke Kome, a port on the 
Arabian coast “just to the left of Berenike.”138 However, it has been noted by De Romanis that, 
rather than simply being ports like Berenike and Myos Hormos, Leuke Kome was an emporium 
similarly to Coptos and Alexandria. This is significant because this status made it one of the 
locations where the tetarte could be collected and Indian Ocean goods could be sold.139 This 
certainly indicates therefore that Leuke Kome was a strategically critical location.  Then again, 
while the Periplus clearly states that there was a centurion and troops based in a fort at Leuke 
Kome the author does not offer any indication of how large this contingent was.140 On the other 
hand, that these soldiers were entrusted with collecting taxes in Arabia before Rome annexed 
the region then security would certainly have been a critical concern. Nappo moreover, has 
also noted that Leuke Kome was a two to three-day sail away from Myos Hormos.141  
 
This combination of isolation within a foreign territory and the need to efficiently collect 
revenue from the Indian Ocean trade certainly suggests that the contingent of soldiers would 
have been quite large by the standards of Rome’s deployment in the Eastern Desert and the 
Red Sea. Due to the presence of a centurion who the Periplus states was in command of the 
soldiers at Leuke Kome, it seems reasonable to assume that the garrison of Leuke Kome was 
at least as large as the one stationed at Mons Claudianus. However, it is possible, although this 
is conjecture, that as there was a fort at Leuke Kome and given its relative isolation from easy 
reinforcement within a potentially hostile territory that the centurion may have commanded a 
full century of 80 soldiers.142 Thus Leuke Kome appears to have represented a major overseas 
 
137 Nappo, 2017a, p.116 also suggests that Rome’s Red Sea fleet was divided between Myos Hormos and 
Berenike.  
138  Casson, 1989, p.7-10; PME.19, translation Nappo 2010. For more on the debate about who these soldiers 
belonged to see Chapter IV. 
139 De Romanis, 2020, p.180; 305. 
140 PME.19.  
141 Nappo, 2010, p.341; Srab.16.4.23. 
142 Gilliver, 2008, p.189. 
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investment of Rome’s military manpower at least until early in the 2nd century AD when Trajan 
turned Arabia into as a province.143 However, while the military presence at Leuke Kome may 
have been reduced in the early 2nd century a further overseas deployment which was connected 
to the Indian Ocean trade appears to have quickly taken its place.       
 
The Farasan Islands 
In addition to its forces in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea, the Roman state also dispatched 
soldiers to garrison the Farasan Islands, a chain located at the mouth of the Red Sea, close to 
the Gulf of Aden and some 1,000 kilometres to the south of Egypt’s provincial border.144 Two 
inscriptions indicate that Rome’s troops had been stationed on the islands by the middle of the 
2nd century AD.145 Moreover, these inscriptions demonstrate that, not only was this garrison a 
mixture of legionaries and auxiliaries it was also involved in building work on the islands. This 
included several small structures and defensive towers.146 Although these inscriptions are small 
and one is very fragmented the more complete of these, dating to 144 AD, clearly shows that 
the Prefect of the Farasan Harbour and the Herculian Sea oversaw these operations.147 Posting 
such an official to the Farasan Islands is an important indicator, both of this location’s 
significance and the size of its garrison. Indeed, by examining the ranks of officers attested in 
the Eastern Desert Maxfield has observed that, with one exception, the commanders of the 
praesidia garrisons do not rank above that of the centurion or decurion of an auxiliary unit.148 
Thus, it seems likely that the Farasan Prefect would have outranked these officers.  
 
Although this is not conclusive proof, this, along with the isolated position of the islands 
certainly suggest that the garrison, presumably under the Prefect’s command, would have 
needed to outnumber those assigned to the praesidia. Indeed, it is possible that the size of the 
Farasan Islands’ garrison was comparable to that of Mons Claudianus where Maxfield 
highlights that a legionary centurion was in command. This made him the highest-ranking 
military officer in the Eastern Desert, aside from the Prefect of Berenike.149 Given the remote 
 
143 Nappo, 2015a, p.63-64. 
144 Cobb, 2018b, p.118-119; Speidel, 2015, p.89. 
145 Speidel, 2015, p.89-90; de Proce, 2019; AE 2005, 1640 = AE 2007, 1659; 1643 = AE 2005, 1639 = AE 2007, 
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position of the Farasan Islands and its probable role in providing security it is, therefore, more 
than likely that the Farasan Prefect controlled at least as many troops as the Mons Claudianus 
commander if not more. Indeed, since the islands would have needed to be supplied by ship it 
is also very likely that the Farasan Prefect might have had control of part of the Red Sea fleet. 
This would have further supplemented his available manpower. Thus, if the Farasan Prefect 
also had access to perhaps five of Rome’s 40 triremes in the Red Sea then it is a reasonable 
conjecture that the Farasan garrison could have numbered somewhere above 110 men. 
 
Soldiers Outside of the Eastern Desert  
It has been argued throughout that scholars are right to suggest that as many as 1,000 men were 
stationed within the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea during the 2nd century AD. However, it 
appears that additional units were garrisoned just outside of the region. These included more 
than 500 men based at Contropollonis and a further 500 cavalry stationed at Coptos.150 In 
addition to this, Speidel notes that by 216 AD a unit of Palmyrene archers was also relocated 
to the Eastern Desert and based out of Coptos, although, the size of this force is unknown. 
These archers, Speidel suggests, were seconded to the region either due to their experience 
operating in Palmyra’s desert or to further the interests of their merchants’ active in the Indian 
Ocean trade.151 While either suggestion is plausible the first indicates that many of this unit’s 
members were probably detached for duties across the desert. Indeed, the practice of dividing 
a unit is well-attested from records of troops stationed along Hadrian’s wall.152 Consequently, 
it is unlikely that the entire unit of archers or, indeed, the cavalry would have been present at 
any one time. Similarly, this situation is potentially true of the Contropollonis garrison. Indeed, 
these units likely provided many of the troops that manned the praesidia and other locations.   
 
Nevertheless, the presence of additional, sometimes very large units, makes it plausible that, 
while c.1,000 men were routinely deployed in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea proper, 
perhaps as many again were deployed at key locations like Coptos and Contropollonis. These 
were both crucial access points into the region. Thus, although this suggestion is certainly 
hypothetical it is very possible that, far from being limited as the opening quote from Adams 
 
150 Sidebotham, 2011, p.260; Fink 1971 cited in Sidebotham, 2011, p.260.  
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suggests, Rome could have sent as many as 1,500 or 2,000 soldiers to the Eastern Desert, the 
Red Sea and the surrounding area. If this was the case, then this force would have represented 
as much as 10% of Rome’s military power in Egypt in the early 1st century AD and 20% by 
the early 2nd century AD.153 For so many additional troops to have potentially been posted 
outside of the Eastern Desert would have not only been logistically necessary but was also 
advantageous for several reasons. This arrangement would have firstly accounted for the need 
to ensure supplies of food and due to the difficulties of obtaining sufficient water.154 However, 
having so many additional soldiers positioned at the entrances to the desert would have also 
prevented the smuggling of valuable materials such as wood which appears to have been a 
matter of genuine concern.155 On the other hand, it would have also allowed for the easy 
rotation of the desert garrisons.156 Finally, having additional forces nearby would have allowed 
for the undertaking of small-scale offensive actions against the barbaroi.157   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that, far from being limited, the Roman military presence in the Eastern 
Desert and the Red Sea represented a significant investment by the state. Indeed, this 
deployment of perhaps as many as 2,000 men represented about 10% of Rome’s armed forces 
in Egypt in the early 1st century AD and 20% by the early 2nd century AD. Moreover, this 
chapter, by adopting a flexible approach to the evidence has attempted not only to broadly 
confirm previous estimates but also to offer original figures for the size of Rome’s praesidia 
garrisons, Mons Claudianus, the Red Sea fleet, the Leuke Kome fort and the Farasan 
contingent. While these latter discussions are, by necessity, highly speculative they are based 
on a plausible reading of the surviving evidence. These military assets, as has been hinted at 
throughout this chapter, gave the Roman state the means to implement measures intended to 
guarantee the acquisition of the tetarte. Moreover, it was observed that the increases in the 
number of troops that would have proactively protected revenue were deployed apparently in 
reaction to changes in circumstance such as an increasing hostility and fortification in the 
Eastern Desert.    
 
153 On the number of Roman soldiers deployed in Egypt between the 1st and 3rd centuries AD see Appendix III.  
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Security in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea 
 
The remaining areas to the south are inhabited by the Trogodytes, 
Blemmyes, Noubai, Megabaroi and the Ethiopians above Syene. 
These peoples are nomads, lack numbers and are not warlike, but they 
were considered to be so by men of former times because often as 
brigands they attacked those without protection.158    
 
The primary function of Rome’s military forces in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea is often 
thought, in contrast to the view of Strabo expressed in the opening quote, to have been the 
protection of merchant caravans travelling between the Red Sea and the Nile Valley from 
attack.159 That the danger was very real  is made clear by Pliny the Elder shortly after Rome’s 
occupation of the Mediterranean end of the Indian Ocean trading network.160 This threat is also 
confirmed by military documents recovered from the praesidia which refer to the attackers as 
the barbaroi.161 On the other hand, despite acknowledging the risks which the barbaroi 
presented Young has instead argued that the state military’s primary duty was not to protect 
merchants but rather to monitor their activities.162 This, Young suggests, was to ensure that the 
state received the correct amount of tax revenue from the Indian Ocean trade.163 On the face of 
it, given that this income was the foremost reason for the state’s involvement Young’s view is 
very reasonable. However, in response to Young, Cobb has argued that while supervising 
merchants was certainly an important function of the military their contributions to security in 
the region cannot be underestimated.164 Indeed, Cobb advises that this function became 
increasingly important early in the 2nd century AD.165 Given these contrasting views, it is, 
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therefore, necessary to determine the extent to which the Roman military proactively provided 
security in the Eastern Desert.  
In addition to these dangers, piracy is increasingly being recognised as another major threat to 
the merchants that traversed the Red Sea.166 Indeed, fragments of Strabo and Diodorus, who 
appear to be using material by Artemidorus and Agatharchides, suggest that piracy had been a 
significant problem in the region since the time of the Ptolemies.167 However, similarly to 
Young, despite recognising testimonies on the dangers of piracy in the Red Sea during the 
Roman period Schneider has cautioned that there is not enough evidence to determine the 
extent of the threat.168 On the other hand, Speidel, McLaughlin and Nappo have argued that the 
military went to great lengths to control piracy in the Red Sea. This included stationing troops 
on the Farasan Islands and patrolling the Red Sea itself.169 Consequently, considering these 
somewhat opposing views it is also important to examine the extent to which Rome’s Red Sea 
fleet provided security in the Red Sea. Finally, through considering the increased state 
provision of security in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea it may be possible to emphasize 
that this was potentially a reactive measure that was driven by the desire to proactively collect 
the tetarte.     
 
The barbaroi of the Eastern Desert  
The reason for the deployment of Roman soldiers in the Eastern Desert is usually connected 
with references to the barbaroi a nomadic population that inhabited the area and posed a danger 
to members of the intrusive populace.170 Like the threat of piracy in the Red Sea fear of attacks 
by the barbaroi seem to have been a concern since the Ptolemaic period.171 This was likely a 
significant reason for the presence of Lagid troops which Strabo says guarded the Red Sea.172 
On the other hand, despite frequent appearances in Ptolemaic and Roman written material very 
little physical or literary culture has survived from the barbaroi themselves.173 Indeed, while 
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caches of so-called Eastern Desert Ware have been discovered and at least one document 
referring to a ‘King of the Blemmyes’ has been found these appear to date from the Late 
Antique period.174 As a result, much of what is known about the barbaroi is derived from 
literary sources and ostraca written in Greek and Latin many of which are highly generalist and 
often derogatory.175 Nevertheless, these sources do suggest that the barbaroi, rather than being 
a single collective, were made up of many distinct groups some of which were identified by 
their culinary habits. This included the Fish-eaters and the Wild-animal eaters.176  
However, other groups, such as the Troglodytes, appear to have inhabited entire sections of the 
Eastern Desert.177 This has led some, such as Lasanyi, to propose that one such group, the Beja, 
had a distinct culture spanning from the 1st to the 3rd century AD. However, Cuvigny has 
correctly observed that the situations of different groups prevented the development of any 
such unified culture.178 Indeed, that Pliny the Elder lists the names of several additional groups 
confirms the view that there was likely no single culture amongst the Eastern Desert’s nomadic 
inhabitants.179 Perhaps in part due to this apparent lack of cultural unity warfare seems to have 
been a common feature of these societies with literary descriptions of them using small shields 
and clubs.180 This certainly indicates that the barbaroi were capable of threatening the intrusive 
populations of the Eastern Desert. This would certainly, therefore, justify the deployment of 
Rome’s military forces. 
 However, some groups of barbaroi appear to have co-operated with the Eastern Desert’s 
Roman and before them the Ptolemaic inhabitants. This included marrying individuals, 
requesting permission to relocate a fishing boat and delivering fish to the workers of a quarry.181 
These individuals (or groups), as the ostraca show, rather than being referred to as a barbaros 
are, at least in two instances, referred to as ‘Arabes’ or people living to the east of the Nile 
Valley.182 Moreover, as is indicated by the two ostraca mentioning an Arabes coming to sell 
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fish it is clear that these groups would trade with the praesidia.183 However, this example also 
indicates the potentially complex and dual nature of the relationship between Rome and the 
nomadic groups of the Eastern Desert. This is because a further document shows that the 
barbaroi were aware of the prices which goods that were stolen from trade caravans could 
fetch.184 This suggests that one day’s trading Arabes could be the next day’s hostile 
barbaros.185 Indeed, since the term barbaroi is used exclusively by military reports this 
suggests that the term was used by the military to refer collectively to hostiles regardless of 
their group of origin.186 While nomadic groups could therefore clearly be co-operative this does 
not preclude them from undertaking aggressive actions although it must, still, be cautioned that 
not all appear to have done so. Nonetheless, where these barbaroi did become aggressive they 
did, at times, represent a life-threatening risk. This is made apparent by an account of a 
particularly well-known raid on the praesidium of Patkoua:  
 
I want you to know that, on 13 March, sixty barbaroi attacked the praesidium 
of Patkoua. I fought them with my comrades from the tenth hour (of the day) 
until the second hour of the night. Then they sat down near the praesidium 
until dawn. On that day, Hermogenes, a foot soldier, of the century of 
Serenus, was killed, one woman and two children were carried off, one child 
was killed. On 14 March at dawn, we fought them. Damanaios, horseman, of 
the century of Victor, [was killed?], Valerius Firm-- was struck, and his horse 
as well.187 
 
Despite this major attack, Cuvigny proposes that the threat to the praesidium was minimal since 
this large group was unable to take the lightly held fortification.188 Similarly, Maxfield has 
argued that, as the modern Bedouin population, the number of barbaroi during the Roman 
 
183 It is unclear who the ‘Arabes’ were. One suggestion by Power, 2007, p.331; 335 it that the Arabes had 
continuously been in the region of Eastern Egypt and were a precursor to the Saracens of the Late Antique 
period.      
184 O.Xer.inv.465.  
185 Cuvigny, 2014, p.174-175 proposes a similar view based off O. Krok.49 although this ostracon is difficult to 
translate entirely due to its fragmentary nature.  
186 Cobb, 2018b, p.94; Cuvigny, 2014, p.198. 
187 O. Krok.87, translation Cuvigny 2014. 
188 Cuvigny, 2014, p.184. 
29 
 
period was small.189 This would, presumably, have made such attacks rare occurrences. 
However, for this attack to result in the abduction of at least one woman, a child, and the deaths 
of two cavalrymen and one infantryman suggests that this attack was a genuine existential 
threat to this praesidium. Indeed, to have lost two men from a garrison which Cuvigny proposes 
was 15 men strong represents a high percentage of casualties. Furthermore, that other ostraca 
record attacks in which casualties were taken indicate that the raid on Patkoua was probably 
not unique.190 Additionally, letters such as that received by Melanas cautioning against leaving 
the protection of the praesidium for fear of attack suggests that this was the case.191 Thus, 
although Young suggests that security was not the primary concern of the military and Cuvigny 
sees the threat of the barbaroi as limited it is the case that they represented a significant threat. 
This needed to be met with armed force. Much of this hostility was likely due to a combination 
of factors. This included encroachments on territory and the expansion of the Indian Ocean 
trade which increased the number of valuable caravans on the desert roads. However, other less 
obvious factors such as a takeover of emerald mines between 26/25 BC and 11 AD have also 
been proposed.192   
 
The Pirates of the Red Sea 
Similarly to the barbaroi, pirates appear to have been enough of a concern for Rome to deploy 
military assets in the Red Sea.193 This also appears to have been a concern for the Ptolemaic 
Pharaohs who were compelled to deploy several quadriremes to combat the problem.194 
Moreover, that this continued to be a significant problem in the Roman period is suggested by 
the Periplus when the author warns that shipwrecks off the Arabian coast would be plundered 
and anchored ships would be subjected to raids.195 Despite acknowledging this threat to 
commercial activity Schneider cautions that the surviving evidence does not provide any 
numerical data with which to effectively determine the impact of piracy.196 Certainly, while 
accounts of piratical activity do not supply any specific numerical information Pliny the Elder 
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implies that there were enough pirates for them to have utilised small rafts.197 Similarly, where 
authors such as Lucian and Jerome do not offer any precise information on the number of 
pirates involved, they do suggest that there were frequently dangers involved in crossing the 
Red Sea.198 This implies that encountering pirates was a regular occurrence. On the other hand, 
Diodorus, who uses information from an earlier Ptolemaic era source, provides comments from 
which to infer the potential extent of the problem:  
 
In ancient times these men [the Nabateans] observed justice and were 
content with the food which they received from their flocks, but later, after 
the Kings in Alexandria had made the ways of the sea navigable for their 
merchants, these Arabs not only attacked the shipwrecked, but, fitting out 
pirate ships, preyed upon the voyagers... some time afterward, however, 
they were caught on the high seas by some quadriremes and punished as 
they deserved.199 
 
While Diodorus’ account does not provide any figures for the number of pirates he does make 
it clear that the Ptolemaic response included the deployment of quadriremes. These were 
military vessels which had their origins in the 4th century BC when warships began to 
dramatically increase in size.200 As a result, large military vessels became a defining feature of 
the navies of Hellenistic states including the Ptolemies.201 In addition to the increase in the size 
of ships, their crews also became larger. Thus, while earlier triremes are thought to have carried 
c.200 crew later ships, such as the quinquereme, is believed to have carried c.364 crew 
members.202 More importantly, these larger crews included greater compliments of armed 
marines. This meant that while a trireme is thought to have carried c.10 marines a quinquereme 
is believed to have carried c.40.203 Using the reconstructed crew roster of a Rhodian quadrireme 
Pitassi has suggested that it carried a mixed force of 30 archers and marines.204 Moreover, 
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Pitassi has proposed that the quadrireme, weighing c.60 tons, was faster and more 
manoeuvrable than the quinquereme.205 Indeed, this mobility and speed are shown by Hannibal 
the Rhodian’s infamous running of the Roman blockade of Lilybaeum during the First Punic 
War.206 For the Ptolemies to choose to deploy these fast, mobile and heavily armed ships to the 
Red Sea indicates that piracy was enough of a problem to require a large and specialised 
response. Indeed, this second point is supported firstly by the case of Hannibal the Rhodian 
and secondly by De Romanis emphasis that lower tonnage ships would have been needed to 
easily navigate the northern reaches of the Red Sea.207 That quadriremes were lighter and more 
manoeuvrable than other Ptolemaic vessels confirms that the choice of ship was seemingly 
tailored for the challenges of the Red Sea.  
However, while it is true that Diodorus does not specify how many quadriremes were deployed 
his account clearly states that it was more than one. As a result, piracy in the Red Sea was 
apparently serious enough to have required multiple ships each carrying 30 soldiers. While this 
deployment likely represented only a tiny portion of the Ptolemaic fleet it is, nonetheless, 
strongly indicative of a notable threat.208 Thus, while it must be cautioned that the scale of Red 
Sea piracy under the Ptolemies should not be directly correlated to the Roman period given the 
later need for a permanent fleet it likely remained a major concern. Indeed, Schneider himself 
rightly recognises that piracy would have probably increased as Rome’s trade in the Indian 
Ocean expanded.209 Consequently, similarly to the barbaroi, security would have been needed 
to prevent piracy.                        
 
Security in the Eastern Desert  
Despite acknowledging the threat that the barbaroi posed Young, whose monograph was 
published in 2001 and before the full publication of the results of the IFAO’s work in 2003 and 
2005, proposes that the main role of soldiers in the Eastern Desert, rather than protecting 
merchants from attack, was instead monitoring their movements.210 This assertion is based on 
two strands of evidence. Young’s first point is that the evidence shows that security was 
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provided by private guards rather than Rome’s military. Young’s second point, in contrast, is 
that, by examining the placement of the praesidia, it appears that they were positioned for 
observation rather than defence.211 That guards, which were hired privately, were frequently 
used by merchants to escort their caravans is well-attested by both the Coptos Tariff and the 
Muziris papyrus. These documents date to the end of the 1st and the middle of the 2nd century 
AD respectively.212 The Coptos Tariff lists a ‘guard’ as being charged at a rate of five drachmae 
to travel along the roads connecting Coptos to the Red Sea ports.213 That these guards regularly 
escorted merchant convoys, moreover, is hinted at in the Muziris papyrus when the borrower 
of the loan informs his lender that the Hermapollon’s cargo will be accompanied under guard 
to Coptos.214  
Young is, therefore, undeniably correct to posit that privately hired guards were critical to 
Indian Ocean traders for protecting them from attack. Furthermore, although it is impossible to 
determine the number of guards that were involved in transporting the Hermapollon’s cargo, 
that the state charged a fixed rate for a guard to enter the Eastern Desert suggests that hiring 
private security was an especially common practice.215 Moreover, the Muziris papyrus may 
represent the terms of a standard loan contract for participants in the Indian Ocean trade, 
suggesting that it was commonplace for investors to stipulate requirements relating to the 
provision of private security (to ensure the safety of their investment).216 Thus, it appears that 
the evidence strongly supports Young’s view that soldiers were not needed to provide security. 
Instead, it seems that this role was fulfilled by private contractors. Indeed, where the evidence 
shows that military escorts were provided, these appear to have been only two or three 
cavalrymen and required approval from the Prefect of Berenike.217 This, Cobb has rightly 
argued, would have made using private guards a necessity.218 
On the other hand, while private guards were doubtless a crucial means of providing security 
in the Eastern Desert Cobb rightly cautions that the contribution of state forces must not be 
underestimated.219 This becomes starkly apparent considering the location and, as has been 
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noted, the size of some of these attacks. These attacks are certainly apparent from the start of 
the 2nd century AD with ostraca dating between AD 102/103 and 118 recording several assaults 
on the praesidium of Krokodilo.220 Although no comparable ostraca reporting such attacks 
survive from the 1st century AD, there are inscriptions which allude to the reconstruction of 
fortifications at several of the other praesidia. Both the inscriptions and ostraca suggest that 
not only did the number of attacks increased during the 2nd century AD, but the praesidia and 
their occupants were at risk of being directly targeted.221 Inscriptional and archaeological 
evidence indicates that a major phase of (re)fortification took place in the Flavian period and 
into the second century AD.222 Cuvigny, among others, has suggested that this increased 
fortification may be in contrast to an earlier more peaceful Julio-Claudian period. One of the 
pieces of evidence cited in support of this is an inscription set (two of six slabs survive) which 
records the construction of cisterns at Apollonos Hydreuma, Compasi and Berenike, and a 
camp (castrum) at Myos Hormos.223 However, the dating of ILS 2483 to the early Julio-
Claudian period is not a definitive and some have noted the possibility that it could be linked 
to Flavian era construction activity.224 Either way, there is little reason to doubt the suggestion 
made by Cuvigny, Cobb and others that the late 1st and into the early 2nd century AD witnessed 
a notable increase in hostilities.  
Moreover, some of these attacks appear to have been directed at the occupants of the praesidia. 
Consequently, in opposition to Young, it is impossible not to closely associate the presence of 
soldiers with providing security in the Eastern Desert. However, since the Muziris papyrus 
suggests that private guards escorted merchants and their goods Rome’s soldiers presumably 
concentrated on defending the praesidia and their immediate area.225 Indeed, the large attack 
recorded in O. Krok 87 and quoted above suggests that this is very likely. It is possible that 
such a large attack on a praesidium was attempting both to obtain valuable plunder and, 
perhaps, to access the sources of water on which these fortifications were regularly situated.226 
Certainly, the potential for caravans to rest and resupply at the praesidia would have made 
these locations tempting targets.227  
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 Similarly, to his first point, Young is certainly correct to observe that, since the praesidia were 
placed directly on the road this made them ideal for observation rather than defence.228 Thus, 
it is possible that this was the primary duty of troops in the region.229 Indeed, it is very likely 
that monitoring the roads was an important aspect of soldiers’ duties. This is suggested by the 
large number of skopoloi that were constructed.230 On the other hand, it is, nevertheless, 
important to highlight several features of the praesidia which appear to have been closely 
associated with defence rather than observation. The first of these is highlighted by Cobb who 
proposes that placing the praesidia on level ground also enabled easier access for both people 
and trade caravans.231 While, in Young’s view, this compromised security the significance of 
this accessibility must not be overlooked, especially, considering the presence of civilians in 
the praesidia. As has already been seen these included women and children. Moreover, the 
account of the raid quoted above which references the abduction of a woman and two children 
strongly suggests that having easy access to the defences of a praesidium, the walls of which 
could be up to five-meters high was of paramount importance.232  
Thus, placing the praesidia on higher, more defensible positions seems to have been 
outweighed by the necessity of accessing these fortified areas rapidly. Secondly, it must be 
noted that when considering where to place the praesidia, the Roman state must have noted the 
locations of natural water sources.233 This water, which was normally accessed via large and 
sophisticated wells was usually located on the valley floor rather than on higher ground.234 
These sources of water were of fundamental importance.235 This indicates, furthermore, that 
the praesidia, as well as being positioned to monitor the roads of the Eastern Desert, also 
accounted for being able to protect civilians and secure supplies of water. Although observation 
was therefore clearly important it is equally clear that the observations which Young makes 
regarding the praesidia were designed to enhance the protective potential of these locations 
and their garrisons.  
Subsequently, while Young makes a series of valid point concerning the nature of security in 
the Eastern Desert and the role of Rome’s soldiers Cobb has rightly posited that this should not 
 
228 Young, 2001, p.69-70; Sidebotham, 2011, p.164-165 also makes a similar observation.  
229 Young, 2001, p.69-70.  
230 Zitterkopf and Sidebotham, 1989, p.155; 186-187; Young, 2001, p.70-71. For more on observation see 
below.    
231 Cobb, 2018b, p.111.  
232 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.55.  
233 See Chapter III.  
234 Sidebotham, 2003, p.89; 2011, p.97-101.  
235 On this see Chapter III.  
35 
 
detract from their contribution to security in the region. Indeed, while private guards seem to 
have escorted merchants the relatively small size of the praesidia garrisons and the increase in 
attacks likely limited most army activity to defending these areas.236 Nevertheless, as military 
reports indicate, Rome’s troops were proactively engaged in defending these locations. 
Moreover, in the limited cases were military escorts were authorised these mounted soldiers 
could very easily have been used to summon reinforcements or disperse small groups of 
barbaroi during an attack.237 As a result of these arrangements, it is reasonable to suggest that 
Roman soldiers which were deployed in larger numbers, doubtless, in reaction to increasing 
attacks in the 2nd century provided a proactive layer of security that offered vital stability to 
participants in the Indian Ocean trade. Consequently, these efforts ensured that the tetarte was 
collected.     
 
Security in the Red Sea     
Although it has been established that Rome continuously maintained a fleet of warships in the 
Red Sea to hunt pirates Simmons also assumes that it protected merchants.238 However, no 
source states explicitly what, if anything, the fleet did to achieve this. On the other hand, the 
Periplus clearly states that pirates were known to frequent certain locations across the Red Sea:  
 
while the area inland has villages and pasturages inhabited by 
people, speaking two languages, who are vicious: they plunder 
any who stray from a course down the middle and fall among 
them, and they enslave any who are rescued by them from 
shipwreck.239  
 
Although this passage does not explicitly mention a response by any military vessels it is 
possible that if the author of the Periplus, who is believed to have been an active merchant, 
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knew where pirates operated then it is highly likely that the captains of Rome’s fleet possessed 
similar knowledge.240 As a result, it is possible that some of Rome’s triremes could have been 
dispatched to patrol areas such as these, particularly around the time that merchants returned 
from India. Given the proposed size of Rome’s Red Sea fleet, that it would have needed to 
focus its patrols on known hot spots rather than escorting individual ships becomes obvious. 
This is abundantly clear for two reasons. Firstly, if the Red Sea fleet did indeed number only 
40 vessels then when compared to the 120 ships which Strabo states traded with India at the 
close of the 1st century BC it would have been impossible for the fleet to have escorted each 
ship.241 The second reason was likely due to the practical constraints involved in navigating 
the Red Sea with triremes. While it has been convincingly argued that, despite the prevailing 
northerly winds, square-rigged Roman trading vessels were capable of navigating up to the 
northern end of the Red Sea within two and a half days this was travelling at six-point-two 
knots and in ideal conditions.242 On the other hand, triremes, which primarily used oared 
propulsion seem to have been able to achieve speeds of seven to eight knots when pressed.243 
Indeed, one infamous example of the peak speeds achieved by a trireme is demonstrated in 
Thucydides account of the Athenian ship dispatched to Mytilene in 427 BC.244 In this instance, 
the crew was able to travel 184 nautical miles within 24 hours. Although such speeds were 
possible it is more likely that the regular speed of a trireme under oar would have been nearer 
the speed of a sailing vessel in ideal conditions. Thus, while the Red Sea fleet would have been 
fast, and mobile considering that it would have had to protect a region of c.438,000 square 
kilometres limiting its geographical focus would have maximised its effectiveness and its 
ability to provide security.    
Alongside these state efforts, Pliny the Elder asserts that groups of archers travelled aboard 
merchant vessels.245 Both Whittaker and Gurukkal have proposed that these were soldiers 
seconded from the military. However, the proclivity of privately hired guards makes it likely 
that these were sourced by similar means.246 Indeed, if Whittaker and Gurkkal were correct and 
each of Strabo’s 120 ships were supplied with at least 10 men then this would have represented 
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over half of Rome’s forces in the region. Regardless, this, in conjunction with the Red Sea 
fleet, would have further deterred pirates in the Red Sea but would also have protected against 
pirates operating off the Indian coast, well beyond the reach of state support.247 As well as 
using the Red Sea fleet to provide security by regularly patrolling certain areas these ships also 
connected the troops stationed on the Farasan Islands (and presumably Leuke Kome) and 
delivered their supplies.248 However, it has already been suggested that these forces on the 
Farasan Islands were involved in maritime security. This is certainly possible since the islands 
were located close to the coast of Arabia and to Aden, both of which were known areas of 
piracy.249  
Furthermore, it has already been observed that the islands were the base of the Prefect of the 
Farasan Harbour and, thus, it is possible that part of the Red Sea fleet was permanently posted 
to the area. All this evidence seems to confirm that the Farasan Islands were an ideal location 
for conducting localised interventions and improving security in the Red Sea. Furthermore, the 
position of the islands, close to the mouth of the Red Sea would have allowed Rome’s troops 
to supervise incoming merchants and so proactively take steps to ensure that the tetarte was 
collected. Indeed, the distance between the Farasan garrison and Roman territory demonstrates 
the state’s commitment to this task. Although the evidence is less concrete it certainly appears 
that Rome’s Red Sea fleet did much to provide security in the region. Moreover, these seem to 
have been actions that were a reaction to the problem of piracy that were intended to proactively 
secure future tax revenue. This potentially included maximising its limited naval assets in areas 
known to have been targeted by pirates. These efforts were assisted by using private security 
on merchant vessels. This subsequently negated the need for the Red Sea fleet to escort 
individual ships. Finally, the members of the Farasan garrison plausibly extended this sphere 
of security far beyond Roman shores up to the mouth of the Red Sea. However, this force 
would have also ensured that the state had control of a key location for merchants returning 
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Campaigns Against the barbaroi 
While Rome’s military defended the praesidia in the Eastern Desert and provided security in 
the Red Sea Cuvigny has proposed that they also undertook at least one campaign against the 
barbaroi. This, she hypothesises, was a retaliatory attack led by the Prefect of Berenike, 
Severus Sulpicius Servenus, in 122/123 AD.251 The brief, two-day campaign, is 
commemorated by a stele set up in the event’s aftermath and dedicated to Jupiter. In his account 
Severenus records that he chased a group known as the Agriophagoi over multiple days. 
Moreover, he states that he fought and killed most of the group and recovered their plunder and 
some camels. Furthermore, he proclaims that he lost no soldiers during the action. On the other 
hand, Cobb has rightly noted that there is no reason to exclude this incident from being a 
planned and unprovoked attack on the Agriophagoi.252 Conversely, while both Cuvigny and 
Cobb could be correct there is a third possible interpretation. In his stele, Severenus explicitly 
states that the Agriophagoi were chased. Consequently, although it is not stated where this 
pursuit began this action could have been, a retaliatory action immediately following an attack. 
However, because the Prefect of Berenike (Servenus) personally led the attack it appears that 
he was commanding an expedition which was organised to hunt down this group.  
While Servenus’ stele does not confirm this or the nature of the campaign one way or the other 
the third possible interpretation stems from the fact that actively seeking out robbers was a 
concern for the Egyptian Prefect. As Fuhrumann has argued, keeping his domain in order was 
one of the principal duties of a provincial governor.253 Thus, it seems likely that, for the Eastern 
Desert and the Red Sea, this duty would have been passed on to the Prefect of Berenike. This 
could therefore have motivated Severenus to claim credit for chasing down the Agriophagoi 
and set up his stele even though he may not have personally participated in the action. Indeed, 
given that the Egyptian Prefect would have visited the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea such a 
monument would have served a very practical purpose for the Prefect of Berenike to advertise 
the successful completion of his duties although this third interpretation is speculation. 
Regardless, it is clear from this example that soldiers did conduct small-scale campaigns 
against groups of barbaroi. 
 
 
251 Cuvigny, 2006a, p.348-349; 2014, p.177-178; I. Pan 8; I. Memnon.20; O. Dios. Inv.90.     
252 Cobb, 2018b, p.110.  
253 Fuhrumann, 2011, p.200; P. Oxy.12.1409.  
39 
 
Smuggling and Supervision  
While it has been shown throughout this chapter that state soldiers were crucial for providing 
security in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea it is still vital to recognise, as Young argues, 
their attempts to supervise merchants and prevent smuggling. It has already been mentioned in 
Chapter I that preventing the smuggling of wood seems to have been a genuine concern. 
Specifically, O. Did.416 mentions an attempt to prevent the smuggling of timber in the port of 
Myos Hormos. That timber was a common target for smugglers is no surprise since this would 
have been a critical resource for activities such as cooking and mining.254 Given the troops 
which were posted in the Red Sea ports, it is likely that soldiers would have been responsible 
for seizing any smuggled goods in and around the ports. Aside from wood, smuggled items 
may well have included pearls and other valuable stones which, De Romanis, astutely observes 
could have had a very high value, could be easily concealed and were difficult to assess for tax 
purposes without an expert’s knowledge.255  However, Cuvigny has suggested that the efforts 
to prevent smuggling may have been more extensive than simply focusing on specific goods.  
Instead, she has highlighted that a request by an unknown Ichthyophagos to move his fishing 
boat was addressed to a paralemptes in Myos Hormos for approval.256 This official was 
primarily responsible for cataloguing and sealing the cargos of incoming merchant vessels.257 
This official was, therefore, essentially responsible for approving the movement of many goods 
from the Red Sea ports. As a result, Cuvigny rightly suggests that fishing boats were likely a 
key component in smuggling operations.258 This she persuasively suggests was reason enough 
for the locations of even small fishing boats to be declared to Roman officials, perhaps in an 
attempt to reduce the impact of smuggling.259 Given the efforts intended to prevent smuggling 
and supervise the movement of goods observed in the Red Sea ports, it would seem logical for 
this mechanism to be in force across the region. To that effect, it is probable that the fee paid 
to travel in the Eastern Desert discussed throughout this chapter would have served to supervise 
the movement of goods and prevention of smuggling by having merchants declare their cargos. 
This would allow us to observe anti-smuggling efforts at both entrances to the Eastern Desert. 
Indeed, it was also mentioned earlier in this chapter that this may have extended into the Red 
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Sea via Rome’s garrison on the Farasan Islands. Thus, given the high degree of regulation that 
was implemented to curb smuggling, it seems only logical, as Young proposes, that the soldiers 
who manned the praesidia would have also been concerned with preventing smuggling. 
However, rather than this being a primary concern over security smuggling and supervision 
should rather be viewed as one of several duties.               
 
Conclusion  
It has been argued in this chapter that numerous dangers beset the merchants involved in 
Rome’s Indian Ocean trade. These included attacks by the nomadic peoples inhabiting the 
Eastern Desert known as the barbaroi and pirates traversing the Red Sea. Throughout it has 
been shown that in response to these encounters a complex network of defence was established 
to provide security. Moreover, it has been suggested that Young rightly proposes that privately 
hired guards played an important role in providing security for travelling merchants while the 
military likely observed their movements. However, it has also been argued, in line with Cobb, 
that the military also had an important role in providing security. Due to increasing attacks 
from the 2nd century AD onwards these efforts were largely confined to the praesidia and the 
immediate area. Despite this, defending these crucial locations provided security to both the 
merchants that halted at the praesidia for rest and resupply and to the civilians living alongside 
the garrison. Moreover, that the praesidia often contained sources of water made the security 
of these sites even more vital. However, it is still possible that cavalry escorts could have 
summoned additional troops in the event of an attack away from a praesidium. Thus, Rome’s 
soldiers did much to provide security and stability in the Eastern Desert. Such actions were 
presumably part of measures that were intended to ensure the collection of tax revenue from 
the Indian Ocean trade. Moreover, that greater efforts appear to have been made to provide 
security from the 2nd century AD, a time of increasing attacks by the barbaroi suggests that 
this was, at least initially, a reactive response by the state to a growing environment of hostility.      
This chapter has also argued that a similar approach was adopted by Rome’s Red Sea fleet. 
Although the evidence for maritime security is scarce it has been suggested that Rome likely 
concentrated its warships on the areas where merchant vessels were known to be most at risk 
of attack. That this was the case is indicated by the author of the Periplus. However, it has also 
been proposed that state efforts were supported by private guards aboard civilian shipping. This 
would have lessened the otherwise impossible burden of the Red Sea fleet escorting each ship. 
41 
 
Indeed, an ostracon which suggests that trading vessels may have sailed in groups would have 
ensured maximum security during time away from any patrolled areas.260 It has been postulated 
that the Farasan garrison was ideally suited to increase security at the entrance to the Red Sea. 
Moreover, this position would have allowed Roman soldiers, similarly to their compatriots in 
the Eastern Desert, to supervise merchants as they left the open ocean. It appears therefore that 
Rome’s navy, like its soldiers, contributed substantially to the security of the Red Sea through 
a series of measures that were probably implemented reactively in response to the threat of 
piracy but with the intention of proactively protecting merchants and thus secure revenue in 
the form of goods returning from the Indian Ocean. Finally, it has been acknowledged that 
while security was perhaps the foremost concern for Rome’s military efforts were made to 
conduct campaigns against the barbaroi and to prevent smuggling in the region. They were, 
again, likely motivated by a desire to secure state profits from the trade.                    
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Potable Water in the Eastern Desert 
 
The primary concern for travellers through and inhabitants of the 
Eastern Desert and along the Red Sea coast of Egypt in antiquity was 
access to and storage and distribution of sufficient quantities of 
potable water for sustained periods. Without this no other activities 
would have been possible.261 
 
As the quote above notes, Sidebotham and others rightly observe that of all the resources in the 
Eastern Desert which included precious minerals and metals none was more vital and thus more 
valuable than potable water.262 However, due to the hyper-arid conditions of the  Eastern 
Desert, its extreme heat, the lack of reliable sources of freshwater and the very large quantities 
required the need to collect and manage this resource effectively was of paramount 
importance.263 It is critically important, therefore, to determine how this was done and, by 
whom. One possibility is that this duty was performed by members of the Roman military. 
Indeed, it has already been noted that the praesidia were generally situated around large and 
reliable sources of freshwater and scholars such as Sidebotham and Broux have argued that 
controlling these locations were a critical component of military activity.264 Certainly, evidence 
such as the so-called ‘customs passes’ and an inscription from the praesidium at Sikyat 
suggests that there was a high degree of military involvement.265 This may well have gone 
beyond simply defending sources of potable water however and potentially included 
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transporting it across the region. If so, it appears that, in addition to providing vital security, 
Rome’s military also guaranteed supplies of potable water. This was arguably the most 
important prerequisite for the continuation of large-scale Mediterranean trade in the Indian 
Ocean. For the military to be involved in controlling such a vital resource was, again, feasibly 
introduced reactively (alongside increasing defensive capabilities in the region) by the state to 
proactively ensure the collection of future tax revenue. This was done by effectively making 
merchants dependent on the state for access to the large quantities of potable water which they 
required.   
  
Potable Water and the Military  
Although no surviving military documents address the daily water requirements of Rome’s 
soldiers in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea directly there is evidence that allows this to be 
extrapolated. This comes in the form of an ostracon from the quarry of Mons Claudianus.266 
This fragmented document (which has already been referred to) records the quantity of drinking 
water that was distributed to the quarry’s staff daily.267 This included soldiers, stonemasons, 
veterinarians and unskilled labourers.268 Moreover, this ostracon demonstrates that the amount 
of water depended on the position and rank of the individual concerned. Consequently, while 
stonemasons received 3.5 litres of drinking water per day an unskilled labourer received only 
2.16 litres.269 However, more importantly for calculating the requirements of soldiers it was 
shown in Chapter I that c.60 of the 917 individuals at Mons Claudianus were military 
personnel.270 These seem to have received the largest water ration with each soldier being given 
6.5 litres per day.271 However, as Mons Claudianus had one of the few centurions in the Eastern 
Desert it is not safe to assume, therefore, that every soldier received this amount. On the other 
hand, 6.5 litres of water per day closely matches the modern-day requirement of 6 litres for 
operating in the Eastern Desert and coincides with the amount that was issued to British troops 
in North Africa during World War II. Thus, it seems that the Romans recognised that a similar 
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minimum of 6 litres of potable water per day was required by the most active or important 
personnel.272  
As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that each soldier in the Eastern Desert and the Red 
Sea received at least 6 litres of potable water per day with officers such as legionary centurions 
receiving the highest quota of 6.5 litres. Furthermore, if we apply this ration to the estimated 
1,000 soldiers in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea at any one time during the 2nd century AD 
then the military alone required c.6,000 litres of drinking water per day. Moreover, while the 
precise number of troops operating in the region may have fluctuated, it is plausible that 1,000 
men were present throughout the year and higher numbers might have been needed during the 
busiest periods of mercantile activity.273 The busiest period  likely ran from late-February to 
March (when peoples travelling to the Egyptian Red Sea ports started to arrive) to mid-July 
(the time that Pliny and the author of the Periplus record as a key time for departure); although  
as Cobb notes, natural factors and man-made causes might lead to some (accidentally) 
departing or arriving late in the season.274 However, there was traffic all year round, with goods 
and supplies being continuously brought to and stored at the Red Sea ports (many trade goods 
were likely stored up in warehouses in anticipation of a new trading season).275 It is possible, 
therefore, that at least 1,000 men were deployed in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea for 365 
days a year.276 This meant that c.2 million and 190,000 litres of drinking water could have been 
consumed by the military during this time.277 Despite a possible four-month gap which could 
have allowed for the replenishment of water supplies the requirements for the military alone 
highlights the logistical challenge and the importance of effective management.278 On the other 
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Potable Water and Merchant Caravans 
 Although it is not representative of the average size of a merchant caravan the Muziris papyrus 
does, similarly to the ostracon from Mons Claudianus, offer a means by which to infer the 
quantities of water that were required by the animals transporting the goods.279 Indeed, while 
the number of humans in this convoy is unknown the requirements of the animals would have 
constituted by far the greatest part of the caravan’s water-based needs.280 While fragmented, 
important information is preserved on both the verso and the recto of the Muziris papyrus.281 
Collectively this information demonstrates that the total value of the goods imported by the 
Hermapollon amounted to c.9 million sesterces.282 Furthermore, the papyrus records that most 
of the goods were obtained during a voyage to the Malabar coast.283 These details have allowed 
Rathbone and Morelli to estimate the pre-tax weight of the cargo at 150 and 180 tons 
respectively.284 These estimates, especially that of Rathbone, are reached by calculating the 
number and subsequently the weight of items from their stated financial value.285 However, De 
Romanis who uses Morelli’s careful rereading of the Muziris papyrus claims that previous 
editors have failed to correctly add an additional item amounting to 771 talents worth of goods 
to the pre-existing total.286 For De Romanis, these 771 talents must have been black pepper or 
malabathrum due to the sheer quantity that is implied.287 Indeed, although Morelli does account 
for pepper in his estimate he gives it a much higher value than De Romanis.288 Certainly, De 
Romanis’ lower valuation is made more plausible by Rathbone’s observation from the Periplus 
that the Malabar ports were frequented during the Roman period primarily for pepper and 
malabathrum.289 However, the inclusion of this missing product drastically increases the size 
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of the Hermapollon’s cargo. Indeed, this elevates it from a respectable 150 or 180-tons to an 
astronomical 625 tons with over 80% of this being comprised of pepper.290       
More recently, however, Evers, in evaluating these studies, rightly acknowledges that all three 
proposals are predicated on a degree of calculated guesswork.291 In Rathbone’s case, he 
assumes that the Hermapollon was a c.300 ton vessel, a relatively large size for a ship of  
Mediterranean origin.292 Furthermore, to determine that four tons of ivory were stowed aboard 
the Hermapollon Rathbone utilises the average weight of the tusks of modern-day elephants.293 
Thus, his calculations are based upon known precedent and reasonable hypothesis. On the other 
hand, De Romanis, despite using the microscopic analysis of the Muziris papyrus conducted 
by Morelli as the foundation of his analysis, relies on numerous hypothetical suppositions in 
his estimate of the weight of the Hermapollon cargo.294 These include a series of complex 
calculations and conversions in an attempt to determine the weight of each item.295 It is 
primarily for this reason that Evers rightly dismisses De Romanis 625 ton estimate for the 
Hermapollon as being representative of a typical cargo.296 Furthermore, De Romanis makes 
clear that he is assessing the Muziris papyrus to validate the existence of very large Roman 
trading vessels which the author of the Periplus notes as having operated off of the Malabar 
coast.297  
Consequently, while the Periplus remains a key source for Rome’s trade in the Indian Ocean 
(one in which the unknown author of the text was directly involved), De Romanis’ clear attempt 
to concur with his statement based on one of the less legible parts of the Muziris papyrus is not 
the most stable basis for a reliable estimate. As a result, when calculating the number of animals 
used to transport cargo and the amount of potable water which they would have required it is 
reasonable to base estimates on a Hermapollon cargo of 150 and 180 tons. However, an 
additional problem comes from the fact that both donkeys and camels were used as modes of 
transport in the Eastern Desert.298 While donkeys can carry c.70 to 90 kilograms, they require 
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c.20 litres of water each day. In contrast, a camel can carry between c.200 and c.335 kilograms 
while requiring just 10 litres of water daily.299 Camels would, therefore, appear to be the 
obvious choice for transporting large or heavy amounts of goods, although donkeys can more 
easily navigate uneven terrain. On the other hand, a camel can carry far more and needed 50% 
less water.300 Nevertheless, while the Eastern Desert roads were not well-constructed, they 
were not difficult to navigate if kept clear of debris and well maintained.301 This would have 
reduced the need to use more nimble transporters in the form of donkeys. Indeed, the Muziris 
papyrus confirms that camels were primarily used to transport the Hermapollon’s goods as the 
title ‘kamelites’ or ‘organiser of camels’ suggests.302  
However, even with the increased carrying capacity of camels Evers estimates that 800 animals 
were needed to carry a 150-ton cargo from the Hermapollon. Moreover, if this cargo weighed 
180 tons then 950 animals were required.303 In contrast, if the goods did indeed total 625 tons 
then 3,300 camels would have been needed.304 Either way, as Evers acknowledges, transporting 
the Hermapollon’s cargo represented an immense logistical effort rivalling the caravans of the 
Early Islamic period. These often comprised as many as 1,000 or 2,000 animals.305 As a result, 
if 800 camels were used then some 8,000 litres of water will have been needed each day. 
Similarly, if 950 camels were required then 9,500 litres of drinking water would have been 
needed daily. Thus, the water requirement for a merchant caravan, for a single day’s journey, 
not including the needs of guards and others, could still have surpassed those of every soldier 
in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea. Furthermore, Pliny states that the journey from Berenike 
to Coptos took at least 12 days.306 Therefore, assuming that there were no delays, the animals 
of the Hermapollon caravan needed somewhere above 96,000 litres or 114,000 litres of 
drinking water during the journey. This, of course, depended on the size of the cargo with even 
De Romanis suggesting that the Hermapollon cargo, which in his opinion, did weigh 625 tons 
there were ostensibly only two ships of this size in operation.307 Furthermore, while water 
represented one logistical issue amassing enough animals was another with Evers noting that 
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the largest privately owned heard of camels included only 26 animals.308 Indeed, even the well-
known company of Nicanor only possessed 36 camels for individual ventures and the largest 
recorded group of camels numbered only 50.309  
Nevertheless, Adams highlights that the state could requisition animals at least along the 
Berenike road.310 This is how Adams suggests that enough animals were available to guarantee 
supplies to ports such as Berenike.311 Indeed, De Romanis has since confirmed that 
requisitioning camels was how the Hermapollon’s cargo (which he estimates required 3,300 
camels) was transported. Moreover, De Romanis has suggested that ensuring that enough 
camels were available was a state service. This is because of his translation of P. Lond. 2.328 
(the same document referenced by Adams) states that one camel was ‘handed… over for the 
imperial services of the caravans from Berenice.’312 While De Romanis recognises that this 
action could have been exceptional and was not done frequently he makes a compelling case 
that this requisition was regularly done for pepper-carriers (of which he suggests the 
Hermapollon was one) which returned from southern India. This is because of P. Lond. 2.328 
clearly stating that multiple caravans were departing only from Berenike which furthermore 
was the only Red Sea port that could have received a very large ship.313 Finally, De Romanis 
points out that the request was made at the time when pepper-bearing ships would have begun 
their return voyage from the Indian subcontinent. That the request was made at this time would 
have given time for the camel in question to travel the 900 kilometres separating it from the 
Red Sea ports.314           
It should, moreover, be noted that the Muziris papyrus clearly states that the merchant is 
required to use the lender’s contacts.315 Given that the lender of the loan which financed the 
Hermapollon’s voyage could well have been one of the paralemptai it is possible that his 
contacts could have included members of the imperial administration.316 This would have 
allowed him to arrange for the appropriate number of camels before the ship’s departure which 
would have been an essential preparation given the number involved, be it 800, 950 or over 
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3,000.317 However, such a service was perhaps only available to a very limited number of ships 
returning from the Indian Ocean trade.318  Regardless, it is still clear that the camels which 
transported the Muziris papyrus required access to very large quantities of water. Indeed, if the 
Muziris papyrus does represent a typically sized cargo (which is unlikely) and 120 such vessels 
did sail to India at the close of the 1st century BC then, even with catchment basins in the 
praesidia that were capable of holding tens of thousands of litres, the task of providing an 
adequate amount of potable water looks almost insurmountable. However, this still represented 
only a part of the potable water that was required.        
 
Potable Water and the Civilian Population  
 It has been noted that civilians represented a significant part of the Eastern Desert’s population. 
Indeed, a letter from an elderly mother to her son serving in the military makes it clear that this 
civilian element was comprised of entire families and included employees in the quarries, 
mines and ports.319 Despite this, the available evidence does not allow for the size of the civilian 
population to be reliably estimated. Nonetheless, some evidence does offer an insight into the 
needs of this part of the population for potable water. Firstly, the population of Berenike (as 
has already been observed) has been estimated by Sidebotham and Wendrich to have numbered 
between 500 and 1,000 people by the Late Antique period. This is based on the remains of 
houses excavated at the site. However, that these date to the 5th century AD, well past the peak 
of Roman involvement in the Indian Ocean trade, suggests that this is a low estimate for 
Berenike’s earlier population.320 This is likely true, even after accounting for fluctuations at 
certain points in the year when merchants departed and returned.321 Secondly, it has also been 
mentioned that the quarry of Mons Claudianus appears to have housed a civilian population of 
c.840 during the 1st century AD.  
Aside from offering further insights on the size of the Eastern Desert’s civilian population the 
ostracon from Mons Claudianus (which has already been discussed) also provides important 
clues about how much potable water these civilians might have consumed. This document 
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makes it clear, as has been observed, that the daily water ration was assigned based upon role 
and rank and distributed a minimum of 2.16 litres of water to unskilled workers. This indicates, 
therefore, that as a minimum, civilians in Berenike and at Mons Claudianus presumably 
received 2.16 litres of drinking water a day. This would have increased demand by an additional 
4,974 litres at just these two sites thus suggesting that the civilian population would have 
required tens of thousands of litres of additional drinking water each day. Indeed, these figures 
do not account for the needs of outgoing merchant vessels which would have required stocks 
of potable water.322 It is clear from the proceeding discussions therefore that ensuring supplies 
of potable water was a gargantuan task. As a result, a sophisticated system would have been 
required to ensure efficient collection and storage. 
 
Collecting and Storing Potable Water   
Given the volume of potable water that was needed it is fundamental to recognise that the 
Eastern Desert is, as a region, singularly unfavourable for amassing the amount required. 
Indeed, it is described by modern excavators as a ‘desiccated and hyper-arid’ environment that 
has an average modern-day temperature of upwards of 45 degrees Celsius during the high 
summer.323 Scholars tend to infer, moreover, that these conditions were prevalent during the 
Pharaonic, Ptolemaic and Roman periods.324 Moreover, an average precipitation level of four 
to five millimetres per year has been measured at Quesir on the Red Sea coast.325 Precipitation 
in the Eastern Desert, in contrast, ranges from three to 25 millilitres per year.326 However, due 
to the high temperatures and low precipitation, this leads to an evaporation rate exceeding one 
hundred times the heaviest annual rainfall.327 Additionally, the concentration of already limited 
precipitation around November and early December causes large-scale flash flooding. This 
added to the already significant environmental challenges for past and present inhabitants.328  
Due to these conditions the Romans, and the Ptolemies before them, by necessity, needed to 
utilise every means at their disposal to find, collect and securely store potable water. After 
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decades of activity in the Eastern Desert Sidebotham observes that this could be done in one 
of several ways. This included collecting rainwater run-off from the mountains, using quluts 
(naturally hollowed-out rocks which collected water run-off) and natural springs fed by sub-
surface water.329 However, Sidebotham rightly notes that such sources, while useful, were 
somewhat unreliable with one natural spring only being able to produce 10 litres of water a 
day.330 Despite this, Krzywinski has postulated that surface water harvested with hafirs (man-
made basins) could have formed an important means of collecting water.331 While it is likely 
that this was not potable, water obtained from these sources may have helped to offset the use 
of water from the wells on gardens.332  In support of this proposition, Krzywinski highlights 
several sites with architectural features possibly associated with hafirs. Moreover, Krzywinski 
analyses a build-up of sediment at other locations that are suggestive of additional sites.333 
However, Krazywinski acknowledges that his hypothesis requires further research to 
substantiate.334 Nonetheless, this proposition is promising and should be added to a list of 
possible means by which Romans acquired water in the Eastern Desert.  
Regardless, large sub-surface wells constituted the principal means for the Romans to access 
potable water. While these varied in size many could hold thousands or even tens of thousands 
of litres. Indeed, examples indicate that these could range from storing c.10,000 litres (Mons 
Claudianus) to c.39,000 (Rod Umm al-Faraj) and c.200,000 litres (Krokodilo).335 What this 
shows, therefore, is that the well of Krokodilo alone could have provided almost enough water 
for two caravans of the larger size discussed above. Thus, it appears that the Romans and 
doubtless the Ptolemies before them made sure to be capable of collecting and storing potable 
water on a scale equal to their requirements. Nevertheless, great care still needed to be taken 
when it came to storing water once it had been collected. To this end, many of the surviving 
wells are encircled by low stone walls. These features, it has been suggested, rather than being 
to prevent people or animals from falling into the well was likely to prevent contamination.336  
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Sidebotham has also suggested that some sort of cover was used to prevent evaporation.337 
Sidebotham proposes that these may have been leather constructs over a wooden frame. 
Furthermore, while he acknowledges that this suggestion is speculative since no covers have 
been found in association with the wells the cisterns do appear to have been covered. This 
makes Sidebotham’s suggestion more plausible. Indeed, those cisterns which survive from 
Roman sites across the Eastern Desert certainly show the level of concern for safely storing 
potable water. This is because they appear to have been constructed with a waterproof lining 
of lime plaster for preventing leaks. Finally, Roman-era cisterns seem to have frequently been 
divided into several tanks. This was potentially designed to reduce the risk of collapse or an 
overflow of water.338 Thus, it seems clear that great technical efforts were made to safely store 
collected water despite the immense environmental challenges. Such a complex and carefully 
considered system of collection and storage of a key resource almost certainly required constant 
management and control. The evidence suggests that this was done by Rome’s armed forces.     
 
The Military and the Control of Potable Water   
When it came to controlling and distributing potable water scholars such as Sidebotham, 
Bagnall and Cuvigny, among others, propose that this was done exclusively by members of the 
military.339 Certainly for ports such as Berenike and Myos Hormos, importing potable water 
was a vital concern since the water at these locations was, then and now, too saline for human 
consumption.340 As a result, some c.240 of the ostraca recovered from Berenike, relate directly 
to the delivery of potable water. However, none of these offers any insights into who performed 
this critical task.341 What is certain however is the military’s role in the provision of the 
infrastructure for the acquisition and preservation of water. This is clear from an important 
inscription found at Sikyat, a praesidium some 7.5km from the Berenike.342 The Sikyat 
inscription commemorates the construction of a hydreumata in 77/78 AD:  
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In the 9th year of Imperator Caesar Augustus Vespasianus, L. Iulius 
Ursus, prefect of Egypt, returning from Berenike gave instructions for 
a well to be sought in this place. When it had been found, he ordered a 
fort and cisterns to be constructed under the direction of M. Trebonius 
Valens, prefect of the desert region of Berenike.343   
 
While this inscription does not explicitly confirm that the military distributed water to Berenike 
it does imply a strong connection between the presence of soldiers and the control of an 
important source of potable water. This site is, moreover, important for several reasons. This 
is because it demonstrates, firstly, that ensuring a supply of potable water for Berenike was a 
concern for the Egyptian Prefect, the chief official and supreme commander of the province.344 
Secondly, Bagnall, Bülow-Jacobsen and Cuvigny argue that the Sikyat inscription represents 
the earliest reference to a praesidium in the Eastern Desert.345 This is important because it 
suggests that not only did Ursus wish to construct a new hydreumata he also wished for it to 
be placed under military control. Furthermore, while the term praesidium is frequently 
translated by scholars as ‘fortlet’ Symonds highlights that the literal translation is ‘garrisons.’346 
This, therefore, supports making a close connection between Rome’s military and control over 
sources of potable water. Tightly controlled locations such as Sikyat, as has already been 
observed, would have been crucial for cities such as Berenike.347 Nonetheless, it is important 
to recognise that while the military may have controlled many of the major sources of potable 
water this does not indicate that soldiers were responsible for distributing it across the Eastern 
Desert.  
This situation is still not clarified, at least initially, when looking at the documents recovered 
from the praesidia. Indeed, of the 2,400 ostraca which have been found very few of them 
mention water at all.348 Instead, the majority reference food and many are letters from the 
occupants of a praesidium requesting various goods such as fish, wine and other items.349 In 
 
343 Bagnall et al, 2001, p.327, translation Bagnall et al, 2001.  
344 See Chapter IV on the status of the Prefect of Egypt.  
345 Bagnall et al, 2001, p.331.  
346 Symonds, 2017, p.12; Cobb, 2018b, p.17.   
347 Sidebotham, 2011, p.102 Myos Hormos likely sourced its water from several nearby praesidia at Bir Kareim.    
348 Young, 2001, p.69; Reddé, 2018, p.194.  
349 Adams, 2007, p.212; O. Claud. I 137-171; O. Claud. II 214; 255-278.  
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contrast, where potable water is mentioned it is in dire circumstances and with great urgency 
as one ostracon implores:  
 
Please send us water by the wagons because we are short and have 
nothing to drink, and please see that you send it quickly.350  
 
Where this message highlights the importance of potable water in the Eastern Desert that 
many praesidia enclosed their own hydreumata suggests that this document is unusual. 
On the other hand, Sidebotham has observed that several of the praesidia on the Coptos 
to Berenike road did not have hydreumata. Instead, they seem to have obtained water via 
channels built to direct run-off into cisterns.351 As a result, Sidebotham suggests that 
these sites either housed only small garrisons or were periodically abandoned.352 Either 
of these suggestions is possible given that the size of garrisons might fluctuate throughout 
the year and due to the difficulties associated with transporting enough potable water for 
even a small contingent of soldiers.353 Regardless, this, along with the example quoted 
above suggest that most praesidia were expected to rely on their own hydreumata to 
supply them with potable water. Despite this, it is apparent from M689 that there were 
occasions in which water had to be transported between the praesidia. This could be done 
in at least two ways, both of which, appear to have involved the military. The first of 
these, as the ostraca from the praesidia show, is via the so-called postal service. This was 
comprised of cavalrymen who rode between the praesidia to deliver official 
communications. These included reports warning of nearby barbaroi.354 Of the soldiers 
stationed at Krokodilo, three of these were designated as couriers of the postal service.355 
However, in addition to their official duties of delivering letters between the praesidia, 
these riders also delivered other items such as fresh fish.356 Moreover, Bülow-Jacobsen 
 
350 M689, translation Symonds 2017.   
351 Sidebotham, 2011, p.95.  
352 Sidebotham, 2011, p.95.  
353 See Chapter I. Based on the calculations outlined above even the smaller praesidia garrisons of 15 soldiers 
would need c.90 litres of water per day. In contrast, Sidebotham, 2011, p.93 refers to modern day Bedouin 
locating natural springs which produce c.10 litres of water per day.  
354 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.562; Sidebotham, 2011, p.152; O. Krok.1-4. Adams, 2007, p.210 sees O. Claud I 
142 as evidence that these couriers may also have ridden camels.  
 355 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.563.  
356 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.563; O. Krok.1. 
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has shown that these postal workers could carry up to 20 kilograms of goods on such 
journeys.357  
On the other hand, it is unlikely that this quantity was carried regularly since it could 
have slowed an otherwise very fast and scheduled system.358 Significantly, one request 
for a skin of water to be sent confirms that the soldiers involved with the postal service 
delivered potable water.359 Thus, it is not impossible that, in an emergency such as the 
one referred to in M689, the postal service could have quickly transported potable water 
to a praesidium in need. However, as was hinted at above, even a small garrison required 
a large amount of water. For example, a garrison of 15 men still needed as much as 90 
litres per day.360 Consequently, even if all three of the postal officers from Krokodilo 
carried 20 kilograms of water this would only have provided two-thirds of the garrison’s 
requirements for a single day.361 Thus, while the military was certainly involved in 
supplying potable water to the praesidia this only represented a small supplement to 
those without a hydreumata. As a result, in cases such as these and the Red Sea ports 
where huge amounts of drinking water were required a larger effort perhaps, as is 
discussed below, involving wagons would have been needed. This also potentially 
involved members of the military.       
In addition to the efforts of the postal service and private merchants, most of the food 
consumed in the Eastern Desert seems to have been delivered by a system of state-
organised caravans.362 This appears to have included at least four separate caravans 
delivering to Mons Claudianus, Berenike, Myos Hormos and the praesidia lining the 
Coptos to Berenike road.363 However, given the number of active sites during the Roman 
period, there may well have been additional caravans delivering to sites such as Mons 
Porphyrites and along the Coptos to Myos Hormos road.364 These caravans moreover, 
 
357 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.562; 2003, 403.  
358 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.563; O. Dios inv.39.  
359 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.565; O. Did 361.  
360 This is if we assume an average of 6 litres per man for a single day.  
361 Personal experience of the author has shown that a single litre of water weighs 1kg.  
362 Adams, 2007, p.206-207. Several letters demonstrate that numerous Nome officials were concerned with 
shipping grain to the communities of the Eastern Desert: SB XIV 12169; P. GISS III 69; P. Oxy XLV 3243. Van 
der Veen and Dyer, 1998, p.101-102 has shown that, at least at Mons Claudianus, the archaeological material 
shows that a wide range of foodstuffs was available. 
363 Mons Claudianus: O. Claud II 245; 273 278; 375; 376. Berenike: Evers, 2017, p.105-106 using Sidebotham 
and Wendrich, 1998, P.85-96 to estimate that Berenike needed 80-160 camels a month to supply a population of 
500-1,000 people. Myos Hormos: O. Max 4 = SB XXII 15455.    
364 Since Mons Porphyrites seems to have been the administrative centre of mining in the Eastern Desert it 
seems unlikely that it did not have its own supply train.  
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were likely to have been very large. If every individual received 1 artabas of grain per 
month then 150 camels would have been needed for the 900 people at Mons Claudianus 
and 80 or 160 would be needed for the 500 or 1,000 people at Berenike.365 An additional 
30 camels would then have been needed to supply the 11 garrisons, each of 15 men, on 
the Coptos to Berenike road.366 Given the logistical challenge of this, it makes it worth 
mentioning once again that the largest known herd of privately owned camels in the 
Eastern Desert were the 26 belonging to the Nicanor company. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the potable water required by the Red Sea ports was probably 
also imported to cities such as Berenike via these supply trains.    
 That this was the case is suggested again by M689 which requests that the recipient ‘send 
water by ‘the wagons.’ This kind of phrasing matches many letters that reference the 
supply caravans. Here they are frequently referred to as ‘the caravan.’ This suggests that 
‘the wagons’ mentioned in M689 could have potentially belonged to this caravan.367 If 
this was the case, however, then this contradicts the image of supply caravans comprised 
of heavily laden camels. On the other hand, other documents do refer to 18 wheeled 
wagons being used. These Peacock has suggested, were used to transport immensely 
large and heavy stone columns from the quarries.368 Furthermore, where there has been 
some debate about what animals were used to haul the product of the quarries, Adams 
highlights the work of Cotterell and Kaminga which has shown that camels make very 
capable draft animals.369 Indeed, camels can haul an estimated 1,000 kilograms and so 
40 animals could have moved columns from Mons Porphyrites which one extant example 
shows could weigh as much as c.207 tons.370 Moreover, Adams has suggested that, given 
the difficulties of assembling additional animals, the caravan which delivered columns 
from the quarries also acted as the state’s supply train on its return journey.371 This logical 
proposition would confirm, therefore, that at least some of the supply trains used wagons. 
 
365 Adams, 2007, p.209; Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.564; Tomber, 1996, p.42; Evers, 2017, p.105-106. 
366 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.564. 
367 O. Did 345; O. Did 404.  
368 Peacock, 1997, p.261-263 suggests that these wagons could carry columns weighing as much as 207 tons. 
Adams, 2002, p.176 agrees with this.   
369 Adams, 2007, p.205; Cotterell and Kamminga, 1992, p.206-214. Maxfield, 2002, p.158-159; P. Oxy.498 
agrees that camels may have been used to haul stone but argues that this was also supplemented with human 
labour. The notion of using human labour to haul columns was first suggested by Peacock, 1997, p.264.    
370 Adams, 2007, p.205; Cotterell and Kamminga, 1992, p.206-214.  
371 Adams, 2007, p.209.  
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Furthermore, it suggests that the same supply caravans were involved in delivering 
potable water to any praesidia in need.372           
These supply trains appear to have been escorted by soldiers who formed some sort of 
patrol. This is referred to in the ostraca by the Greek term probole.373 This has been 
translated by scholars as ‘horse patrol’ but etymologically can refer to anything that is 
thrust forward either offensively or defensively.374 The probole, Sidebotham has 
proposed, was possibly an armed patrol of an unknown size comprised either of soldiers 
or non-military personnel.375 Similarly, in a 2003 article Bülow-Jacobsen has argued that 
the probole was a cavalry patrol.376 However, he has since modified his view and has 
suggested that the probole was, for several reasons, not made up of cavalry.377 The first 
reason is that the author of one letter states that he will travel with the probole because 
he is ‘not pressed for time.’378 To Bülow-Jacobsen, this indicates that the patrol was not 
comprised of cavalry which would presumably have travelled at a high speed.379  
Secondly, Bülow-Jacobsen has suggested that the probole was not comprised of mounted 
horsemen because of ostraca which show that the patrol transported a variety of goods 
between locations such as grain, rope, an amphora and even people.380 Nevertheless 
despite this emphasis on transporting goods Bülow-Jacobsen highlights ostraca which 
demonstrates that the probole was not comprised of donkeys either.381 Based on this 
Bülow-Jacobsen instead suggests that the probole was some form of slow-moving 
military patrol which was accompanied by donkeys that he proposes were organised 
differently to the free-roving drivers trading between the praesidia.382 It seems, therefore, 
that the probole was some form of armed patrol which was likely tasked with screening 
the supply caravans and providing security. However, there is no reason, in contrast, to 
 
372 As noted above Mons Claudianus possessed its own well and so will not have needed to import water at least 
on a large scale.  
373 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567; Sidebotham, 2011, p.152; O. Claud II 227; 279; 375; 376; 380; O. Max 
inv.89; O. Did 462; O. Dios inv.106; 382. Adams, 2007, p.210 appears to similarly connect the probole with the 
delivery of goods throughout the desert.    
374 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567; Bülow-Jacobsen 2003 cited in Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567; 
Sidebotham, 2011, p.152.  
375 Sidebotham, 2011, p.152. 
376 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2003 cited in Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567.    
377 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567. 
378 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567; O. Max inv.89.  
379 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567.  
380 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567; O. Dios inv.106; O. Claud II 227; O. Claud II 367; O. Dios inv. 382; O. 
Did 462; O. Claud 279.     
381 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567. 
382 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.565; O. Krok.inv.252; 603.  
58 
 
Bülow-Jacobsen’s proposal that the probole could not have been comprised of horsemen 
or given the setting, camel riders.  
The first reason for this is because if the purpose of the probole was to provide advance 
security for the supply caravans then it should be no surprise that it would have moved 
relatively slowly so as not to put too great a distance between themselves and the caravan. 
The second reason is that, as has already been seen, with the soldiers of the postal service, 
individuals mounted on horses, could still transport up to 20 kilograms of goods. This 
would have enabled members of the probole to carry modest consignments of grain or 
even a small amphora of wine. Furthermore, frequently transporting such goods in 
exchange for a fee would have offered soldiers an appealing supplement to their salaries. 
In terms of the ostraca showing that people accompanied the probole, it is possible that 
these individuals may have been able to pay a fee to travel alongside assuming they had 
the means to keep up.383  
 Both Bülow-Jacobsen and Sidebotham are uncertain who made up the probole or how 
large it was.384 Although it is possible that the probole was made up of privately hired 
guards this does not seem plausible. This is because the supply caravans seem to have 
been state-sponsored and carried crucial supplies such as food and water to the Red Sea 
ports and other sites.385 Indeed, while Bülow-Jacobsen very rightly suggests that postal 
riders probably had to assist in escorting the caravans the three soldiers recorded as being 
stationed at Krokodilo probably did not represent the entire probole.386 Instead, it is 
possible, although there is no extant evidence that confirms this, that the probole was 
comprised of mounted soldiers drawn from garrisons outside of the Eastern Desert. 
Where many of these troops likely garrisoned the praesidia involvement in the probole 
could explain the placement of a cavalry alae, notionally of 500 men, at the city of 
Coptos. This was the main gateway into the Eastern Desert and one of the points where 
the supply caravans presumably entered the region.387 Similarly, the inclusion of 163 
cavalry with the forces placed at Contrapollonopolis which was located close to the old 
Ptolemaic entry point of Apollonis Maga could suggest that these troops were also 
 
383 While Adams, 2007, p.101; 103 has shown that purchasing a donkey was a major investment he suggests that 
hiring them would be much more affordable. Moreover Adams, 2007, p.111-112 references an unpublished 
ostracon showing that donkeys were sold in Berenike during the reign of Nero.   
384 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.566-567; Sidebotham, 2011, p.152.  
385 See Chapter II for a discussion of the involvement private guards in the Eastern Desert.  
386 Bülow-Jacobsen, 2013, p.564; O. Did 345.  
387 Sidebotham, 2011, p.260; Dijkstra and Verhoogt 1999, 208-218; Pantalacci, 2018, p.19; I. Portes.56. 
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involved in escorting supply caravans.388 Although these escorts were likely not large 
they were certainly larger than the patrols which the ostraca show could be sent into the 
Eastern Desert.389 Assuming that these suppositions are correct then members of the 
military were intimately involved in supplying the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea with 
food and, crucially, with water.    
Finally, Sidebotham and Maxfield have tentatively suggested that access to potable water 
was regulated via the so-called customs passes.390 Indeed in Sidebotham’s view, this task 
was performed by soldiers. These ostraca, which have been recovered in large numbers 
from Berenike, appear to have acted as ‘let-pass orders’ for merchants transporting goods 
through the Eastern Desert for export at the Red Sea ports.391 Where there is some degree 
of variation in these documents Nappo has separated these into three distinct categories:  
 
1. To Andouros, quintanensis, let pass of Tiberius Claudius 
[Achilleus] Dorion for Paouos son of Paouos, 10 italika, total 10 
ital(ika).392 
2. Sosibios to Andouros, greetings. Let pass for Andouros son of Pach 
() 6 italika of wine.393 
3. Robaos to those in charge of the customs gate, greetings. Let pass 
for Haryothes for outfitting, 8 rhodia.394 
 
These examples demonstrate that passes, which appear to have been issued on goods 
such as wine, which acted as both supplies on ship and as an export item to various ports 
in the Indian Ocean, were likely issued on just about all the goods that were destined for 
export to the Indian Ocean market. These, moreover, would need to be carried by 
merchants when travelling in the Eastern Desert.395 Asides from providing a glimpse of 
the nature of Roman exports these passes also offered a means for legitimate merchants 
 
388 Manning, 2011, p.5. 
389 Sidebotham, 2011, p.151; Cobb, 2018b, p.110; Cuvigny, 2005, p.25; 77;82; 94; 154; K458; 315; 519a. 
390 Sidebotham, 2003, p.101-102. Maxfield, 2002, p.160-161.   
391 Nappo, 2017b, p.561; Cobb, 2018b, p.21; Nappo and Zerbini, 2011, p.63-65.  
392 Nappo, 2017b, p.561-562; Nappo and Zerbini, 2011, p.65; O. Ber 51, translation Nappo 2011.   
393 O. Ber 11, translation Nappo 2011. 
394 O. Ber 36, translation Nappo 2011.  
395 Nappo, 2017b, p.561; Cobb, 2018b, p.21; 220-226; Curtius Rufus 8.9.30; Lucian, Nigrinus.5; PME. 6; 7; 17; 
24; 28; 39; 49; 59; Nappo and Zerbini, 2011, p.63-65. 
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to be identified and thus potentially limit or enable their access to water. While Strabo 
states that merchants would carry their own supply of potable water it was highlighted 
above that a caravan of several hundred camels would have needed a huge amount. This 
would have necessitated regular stops at the praesidia. These locations, it has been 
established, were controlled by the military. It is on this basis that Sidebotham suggests 
that the customs passes were used to dictate who could access a praesidium and its 
supplies of potable water.396  
In support of this theory, Sidebotham points out that the Coptos Tariff charges were 
applied to various individuals, items and goods for permission to travel the desert 
roads.397 Amongst those people and items that were taxed were a prostitute, a guard and 
a ship’s mast.398 While this list does not reference potable water Sidebotham’s hypothesis 
suggests that it was included in the cost of a pass.399 Indeed, given the prerequisite for 
additional water and despite the lack of definite evidence this proposition is certainly not 
an unreasonable one. Moreover, the passes seem to have been frequently addressed to 
the quintanenses. These individuals were the officials in charge of the customs gate of 
Berenike and were also members of the military.400 Thus, it may be that the presentation 
of a pass addressed to the quintanenses would have ensured that the commander of a 
praesidium would have permitted the holder access to water.401 It is possible therefore 
that members of the military not only delivered drinking water but may even have directly 
regulated access to it. Given the certain need to obtain water this measure would, more 
than any other, have ensured that the state received the appropriate tax revenue.     
 
Non-Potable Water Use 
While it has not been the focus of this chapter it is nonetheless still important to consider 
the use of water for purposes other than drinking. This is because it will have only further 
increased demand. Where water was used on small gardens to grow food locally some of 
 
396 Sidebotham, 2003, p.101-102. Maxfield, 2002, p.159-160 also suggests this.   
397 Sidebotham, 2003, p.101; OGIS 674.  
398 OGIS 674.  
399 Sidebotham, 2003, p.101-102; OGIS 674. 
400 Nappo and Zerbini, 2011, p.69-70; P. Gen. Lat. I; CIL 137749; CIL 14, 2282. Bagnall et al, 2000, p.8-12; 
Nappo and Zerbini, 2011, p.64; Nappo, 2017b, p.561; O. Ber 11; 36. 
401 Maxfield, 2003, p.163; I. Pan 20; 42; CZL I11 75 = ILS 4424.  
61 
 
the largest consumers of water were potentially cooking and bathing.402 On the other 
hand, no extant evidence offers figures for this during the Roman period. Sidebotham 
has, however, observed that a modern excavator consumes between four and nine litres 
of water per day for cooking and bathing during the summer.403 It has already been seen 
in this chapter that ancient requirements of drinking water were, in some cases, on par 
with the modern-day. Despite this, the amounts which were required for cooking are 
uncertain. However, several small bath complexes have been found in some of the better-
excavated praesidia.404 This might allow for a sense of the water requirements for 
bathing. These baths were generally small with the 48 square metre examples at Dios 
being the largest in the Eastern Desert. However, these installations were clearly 
sophisticated, and some boast a well-preserved caldarium and frigidarium.405 These 
complexes will, therefore, have required hundreds of litres of water. Regardless, it was 
Rome’s mining operations in the Eastern Desert which, perhaps, reserved the potential 
to consume the greatest volume of water asides from drinking.  
It has been observed that mining for gold in the Eastern Desert seems to have entered a 
period of decline under Rome compared to her Ptolemaic predecessors. Regardless, this 
activity will still have required substantial quantities of running water in order both to 
wash the gold ore out of freshly powdered quartz and to excavate mine shafts.406 While 
Klemm and Klemm have proposed that a method of washing the gold ore akin to that of 
the modern Bedouin might have been used it seems unlikely that this was the only 
method. This is because while this method, which uses a sheep’s hide to catch the gold 
ore and then burns the hide to separate the gold ore, is effective the proximity of wells to 
active mines suggests that this water was also used.407 Indeed, Diodorus’ confirms that 
the Ptolemaic miners used water to separate the gold ore and it seems unlikely that the 
Romans would not have done the same.408 The amount of water that was needed for such 
a process was substantial.  
 
402 Krzywinski, 2007, p.48-49. Cappers cited in Krzywinski, 2007, p.48 has argued that these gardens were 
watered using wastewater. Cappers, 2006, p.46 reiterates this view although about the modern gardens. In 
contrast, Sidebotham, 2001, p.108 has argued that they were watered from the cisterns.  
403 Sidebotham et all, 2008, p.304. 
404 Reddé, 2018, p.197-204 shows that bath complexes have been found at Maximianon, Didymoi, Dios and 
Xeron  
405 Reddé, 2018, p.202.  
406 Vanhove and Mussche, 2002, p.27; Klemm and Klemm, 2013, p.8.   




Although only a few examples of washing tables have so far been found in Egypt’s 
Eastern Desert c.250 washeries have been found at Lavriotiki in Attica most of which are 
associated with the Athenian silver industry.409 Certainly, activity in the Eastern Desert 
of Egypt in the Roman period did not reach the scale of silver mining by Athens in the 
Classical period, which left the state with a surplus of at least 50 talents.410 Nevertheless, 
Rome’s gold mines in the Eastern Desert would still have required a large volume of 
water and it has been suggested that evidence of additional washeries remains to be 
found.411 Indeed, Pliny records that entire aqueducts and rivers could be used to excavate 
new Roman mine shafts such as those at Las Medulas.412 If this represents the upper end 
of requirements then even a small scale industry would certainly have represented a 
major drain on water supplies in a hyper-arid environment such as the Eastern Desert.              
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that not only did millions of litres of potable water need to be 
collected and carefully stored much of this activity involved the use of soldiers. These 
troops seem to have conducted a variety of tasks including responding to urgent requests 
for potable water. These requests were met by members of the military-run postal service. 
However, these tasks also appear to have extended to providing security to the supply 
caravans delivering food and water to the ports and quarries. Also, it is possible that the 
soldiers manning the praesidia were responsible for regulating access to potable water 
although this is yet to be proven. Nevertheless, it is clear from their involvement in 
collecting, transporting, and controlling water that, as some have suggested, the military 
sought an almost total monopoly over this critical resource. This monopoly, one which 
would have dictated the continuation of activity in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea 
presumably arose from the reactionary increase in military personnel in the region from 
the 2nd century AD and was intended to attempt to proactively ensure the collection of 
future tax revenue from the Indian Ocean trade. This was done by ensuring that access to 
potable water was effectively controlled by the state.        
 
409 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.220; Vanhove and Mussche, 2002, p.27.  
410 Bissa, 2009, p.51; Hdt.5.97. Hd.7.144 states that the surplus from Laurion was enough to pay for a fleet of 
200 triremes.    
411 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.220.  




The State Officials of the Eastern Desert, the Red Sea, 
and the Indian Ocean Trade 
testimonies emphasize more or less explicitly the political and 
economic importance of trading links and activities within and 
beyond the boundaries of the Empire… the state was very actively 
and self-consciously involved in this aspect of empire.413 
 
It has been shown that Rome deployed a large percentage of its soldiers in Egypt to the Eastern 
Desert and the Red Sea. Moreover, it has been argued that these troops performed several 
crucial roles such as providing security to merchants and managing the supply of potable water. 
These activities, it has been suggested, were reactive measures that were implemented by the 
state in response to an increasingly hostile situation to proactively ensure the collection of 
future tax revenue from the Indian Ocean trade. However, the military personnel stationed in 
the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea were overseen by a complex network of state officials while 
these tasks were conducted. These officials (such as the Prefect of Berenike) have been 
frequently referenced throughout this thesis. Indeed, previous attempts to survey state 
involvement in the Indian Ocean trade have regularly focused on the centralised investments 
in physical infrastructure which were overseen by these officials.414 This chapter, in contrast, 
examines the functions of these officials to identify those activities which were overseen by 
the state. Moreover, it will also be highlighted how these functions changed over time. As a 
result, it will be seen that while the military was responsible for providing security and 
controlling potable water these actions were overseen by an extensive hierarchy of state 
officials. This hierarchy was, furthermore, assumedly another reactive creation on the part of 
the Roman state to proactively ensure the collection of future tax revenue.    
 
 
413 Wilson and Bowman, 2017, p.2. 
414 Wilson, 2015, p.20;21; 31; Cobb, 2018a, p.106-108; 126; Sidebotham, 1986, p.113-174.     
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The Nature of Government Under the Roman Empire  
Following the downfall of the Republic, the Emperor sat at the pinnacle of Rome’s government. 
On the other hand, while the Emperor was the central figure his efforts were supported both by 
members of the imperial court and the regional administrations. Work by Millar has shed 
significant light on the nature of this relationship and has greatly influenced subsequent 
scholarship on Rome’s government during the imperial period.415 Nevertheless, a reasonable 
premise of how the central government operated is provided by Aelius Aristides who wrote 
during the 2nd century AD:  
 
And if the governors should have even some slight doubt whether certain claims 
are valid in connection with either public or private lawsuits and petitions from the 
governed, they immediately send to him (the emperor) with a request for 
instructions what to do, and they wait until he provides a response, like a chorus 
waits for its trainer. Therefore, he has no need to wear himself out by traveling 
around the whole empire, nor, by appearing in person, now among some, now 
among others, to make sure of each detail when he has the time to tread their soil. 
It is easy for him to stay where he is and manage the entire civilized world by 
letters, which arrive almost as soon as they are written, as if they were carried by 
winged envoys. 416 
 
This passage reflects the fundamental changes in Rome’s government following Octavian’s 
victory at the Battle of Actium in 31 BC and the establishment of the Principate shortly 
thereafter.417 Despite notionally being the first citizen of a restored Republic, as is indicated by 
Octavian’s (later given the honorific title Augustus) Res Gestae, it is shown in a more material 
sense by Augusts’ issues of coinage that the Principate became, practically speaking, an 
established monarchy.418 Moreover, that this imitated the style of the eastern Hellenistic 
kingships is shown by the language used in addresses to the Emperor, the trappings of power 
such as the imperial palace, the establishment of an imperial court and a monopoly over the 
 
415 Millar, 1992, p. ix. 
416 Ael.Or.26, translation Corcoran 2014.  
417 Potter, 2009, p.162; 165-168.  
418 Rowe, 2006, p.114; Wolters, 2012, p.342; Paterson, 2007, p.121; Aug.Res.1.  
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armed forces.419 Nevertheless, at a practical level, as Aelius’ passage indicates that the Roman 
Empire was run by appointing officials, secretaries and governors who were then spread 
throughout the provinces.420 While it is apparent that provincial governors retained almost 
supreme power within their spheres of control their status and the progress of their careers 
depended entirely on retaining the good faith and trust of the Emperor.421 Moreover, the actual 
method by which the government operated, both at an imperial and provincial level appears to 
have been via a system of petitions and responses. This system frequently took the form of 
letters and face-to-face embassies and is demonstrated most clearly in the correspondence of 
Pliny the Younger, acting as the proconsul of the province of Bithynia, and Emperor Trajan 
between 111 and 112 AD.422 This correspondence shows that Pliny frequently contacted Trajan 
for various reasons such as for advice on a course of action, a judgment on legal issues or a 
response to a petition from a third party.423  
Consequently, Fuhrumann is presumably correct to argue that the Emperor tended to remain 
aloof of provincial matters unless problems were brought to his attention.424 That this was the 
case is indicated by the sheer volume of correspondence which was presumably received by 
the Emperor and in which he seems to have been involved.425 This would certainly have 
reached thousands of cases.426 Thus, it was primarily through the various governors and 
officials who toured their provinces and oversaw specific assignments on behalf of the Emperor 
that imperial government and state requests were carried out.427 Such a system, while effective, 
was, however, slow and logistically difficult as Millar and Corcoran have recognised.428 This 
was due primarily to the distance between Rome and many of the provinces. However, this 
was further complicated by the fact that provincial governors, as part of their imperially 
mandated duties, were required to travel across their territories to hold court and to receive 
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petitions.429 This would have further increased the distance between governors and the 
Emperor. On the other hand, this was also true of the Emperors themselves who in some cases, 
such as Trajan, are renowned for spending large portions of their reign campaigning away from 
Rome.430  
For Rome’s government to function effectively therefore depended upon reliable long-distance 
communication.431 This role, it has been suggested, was fulfilled by the cursus publicus which 
is believed to have been a state-organised system of messengers who utilised designated 
staging-posts situated throughout the Empire to deliver communiqués.432 However, the 
existence of such a formal system has been debated, with Corcoran arguing that it did exist as 
a passage from Suetonius’ Life of the Divine Augustus suggests.433 In contrast, Millar argues 
that Suetonius’ solitary reference is not enough evidence to support the proposition that such a 
large system existed.434 Millar takes this view despite rightly acknowledging the necessity of 
long-distance messengers for effective Roman government. Instead, he suggests that this was 
facilitated by the ability of officials to requisition animals, men and guides to transport 
messages as well as the obligation of local communities to provide assistance.435 Conversely, 
it is possible that Suetonius, in a similar trend to that found in the work of Strabo, is trying to 
emphasize the level of organisation which Augustus brought about compared to what had been 
in place before. Indeed, it has already been shown that a system of state organised messengers 
did exist in the Eastern Desert.436 This makes it very feasible that a larger system of state 
messengers was used across the empire.   
It has been seen that these messengers delivered reports, letters and vital necessities and so 
were an important instrument of state interaction.437 It is not impossible therefore that Augustus 
could have utilised a similar system, to some degree in Italy. This is certainly what Suetonius 
passage indicates.438 As a result, while this system was used across the Empire, it may have 
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been established on a province-by-province basis.439 Regardless, geographical constraints 
continued to present a significant challenge for the involvement of the central government in 
regional affairs.440 Such limitations, by necessity, resulted in Rome’s government being slow 
and ponderous with some inquiries taking up to four months to receive an answer from the 
Emperor.441 This would have placed an even greater emphasis on the role of governors and 
local officials. Moreover, aside from the desire to closely oversee the Eastern Desert and the 
Red Sea these practical limitations may also explain the number of officials that were assigned 
to the region.  
 
The Prefect of Egypt  
The position of the praefectus Aegypti (Prefect of Egypt), similarly to the province of Egypt 
itself,  was unique compared to other senatorial and imperially appointed positions.442 For one, 
the Prefect of Egypt was an equestrian rather than a senator and, moreover, he was the only 
non-senator permitted to command both legionary and auxiliary troops.443 In practice however 
the Prefect of Egypt acted similarly to many other provincial governors and was tasked with 
managing construction, travelling to hold judicial courts and responding to petitions from 
within his province.444 However, the Prefect of Egypt was also one of the few governors that 
was entrusted to oversee the collection of provincial taxes rather than this duty being fulfilled 
by a procurator.445 Furthermore, his imperial mandata (mandate) included the vital task of 
ensuring the export of grain to Rome.446 As a result of being tasked with overseeing the entire 
province the Prefect of Egypt was also closely involved in overseeing the affairs of the Eastern 
Desert, the Red Sea and, by extension, the Indian Ocean trade. An example, of this 
involvement, is shown by the campaign of Aelius Gallus in 26/25 BC.447 Although the motives 
behind this action are unclear its scale cannot be doubted since Strabo (Gallus’ companion) 
states that the forces that were mustered included 10,000 imperial troops (half of Egypt’s 
 
439 Plin.Ep.10.46; 47 preserves one enquiry to Trajan concerning passes for messengers in Bithynia.   
440 Millar, 2004, p.41 notes that letters were constantly being exchanged and would travel across thousands of 
kilometres within the Empire.  
441 Corcoran, 2014, p.204; Petrus Patricius.frag.8.  
442 Derda, 2019, p.59; Goodman, 1997, p.107; Eck, 2019, p.191-192.  
443 Eck, 2012, p.191-192. 
444 Eck, 2019, p.189; 192; P. Yale. 1.61, lines 5-7 shows that the Prefect of Egypt received some 1,084 petitions 
in just two days. 
445 Derda, 2019, p.59; Eck, 2019, p.190.  
446 Derda, 2019, p.59. 
447 Strab.16.4.22; Aug.Res.5.26; Plin.NH.6.32.160; Jos. AJ.15.317; Dio.29.3-8.  
68 
 
garrison in the 1st century AD), 1,500 allied soldiers and over 200 ships.448 On the other hand, 
Gallus’ campaign seems to be the only one of this scale during the imperial period.449  
Nevertheless, the Sikyat inscription shows that in 76/77 AD the Prefect of Egypt, Iulius Ursus, 
continued to be directly involved in the affairs of the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea.450 
However, it should be emphasized that this event took place during what was probably a routine 
visit to Berenike.451 This visit was probably to attend to his judicial duties as he fulfilled his 
obligation to tour Egypt. Instead, it seems that in the century following Gallus’ campaign the 
Prefect of Egypt’s was primarily brought into contact with the Eastern Desert and Red Sea 
region by responding to petitions, farming out the tetarte from his seat in Alexandria and, as 
was seen in Chapter III organising transport for returning pepper ships.452 This shows that the 
state’s key focus in the region was indeed tax revenue from the Indian Ocean trade. 
Nevertheless, overseeing this area on a day-to-day basis was primarily in the hands of the 
praefectus Montis Berenicidis 
  
The Prefect of Berenike  
Based on the comments of  Pliny the Elder, Maxfield proposes that the post of praefectus 
Montis Berenicidis (Prefect of Berenike) might have been based on an earlier Ptolemaic 
precedent.453 Certainly, an official under this title is attested during the reign of Tiberius (14-
37 AD) and the post of eparchos of Berenike was created by 11 AD.454 The office of the Prefect 
of Berenike, as has been seen, seems to have had a distinctly military character as he 
commanded the Ala Heracliana, a unit that appears to have been based at Coptos and perhaps 
close to Berenike.455 Moreover, an inscription from Coptos suggests that the Prefect of 
Berenike also commanded the praesidia garrisons along the Coptos to Berenike road.456 On 
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the other hand, in earlier scholarship, Sidebotham, Young and Tomber have proposed that the 
role of the Prefect of Berenike became more civilian in nature by the reign of Hadrian (117-
138 AD).457 However, subsequent work by a team under the auspices of the IFAO has drawn 
attention to documents indicating the continuing military nature of this office until c.190 AD.458 
This was an important time of transition in the history of the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea 
as the rate of taxation on the Indian Ocean trade changed from the 25% tetarte to the 12.5% 
octava sometime between 174 and 227 AD.459  
Despite the apparent independence allowed to the Prefect of Berenike, an inscription from 
Aphrodito demonstrates that he reported directly to the Prefect of Egypt.460 Practically, the 
Prefect of Berenike seems to have carried out his office in a similar manner to that of other 
imperial appointees and provincial governors. While his main base of operations appears to 
have been Berenike communications from the praesidia and Coptos indicate that the Prefect 
would travel between these locations in a similar manner to a governor touring his province.461 
For Cobb, this degree of movement enabled the Prefect to easily communicate with both the 
ports of Berenike and Myos Hormos.462 In addition to his military duties, the Prefect of 
Berenike was also responsible for appointing and coordinating the activities of lesser officials 
such as the well-manger and the quintanensis who collected taxes at the customs gates in the 
Red Sea ports.463 Furthermore, the inscription indicating that the Prefect of Berenike oversaw 
the praesidia garrisons suggests that he would have also appointed the garrisons’ 
commanders.464 The Prefect of Berenike will have also overseen construction and maintenance 
in the region.465 Finally, it is possible that the Prefect of Berenike also oversaw attempts to 
farm pearls in the Red Sea, at least during the early imperial period when this activity likely 
took place.466  
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On the other hand, the degree to which the Prefect of Berenike oversaw the mines and quarries 
of the Eastern Desert deserves some attention and is discussed more extensively below. While 
Sidebotham and Maxfield suggest that the Prefect of Berenike did manage the mines and 
quarries Cuvigny has recently proposed that by the later 1st century AD this may not have been 
the case.467 It is generally agreed that the Prefect of Berenike’s authority extended over an 
administrative unit that spanned from the Red Sea coast to the beginning of the Coptos to Myos 
Hormos road.468 This appears to have been the case, as the Coptos Tariff suggests, by c.90 AD 
at the latest.469 On the other hand, Cuvigny points to I. Pan 51 which lists Publius Iuventius 
Rufus, the then Prefect of Berenice, as the archimetallarches or ‘commander-in-chief of mines’ 
in 11 AD.470 However, this mention of the Prefect of Berenike predates the establishment of 
the major imperial quarries of Mons Claudianus and Mons Porphyrites both of which were 
founded later in the 1st century AD.471  
Importantly, the Prefect of Berenike, Cuvigny observes, is never mentioned in the 
administrative documents recovered from these sites.472 Indeed, this is ostensibly because, 
following the establishment of the imperial quarries, the administration of the mining region to 
the north of Coptos was reorganised.473 This area, as receipts from these quarries suggest, 
appears to have been placed under the direct control of an imperial freedman holding the title 
of procurator metallorum.474 Thus, it seems clear that while the Prefect of Berenike did 
temporarily manage the mines and quarries north of Coptos his authority seems to have been 
transferred to another official after the imperial quarries were established.475 It is clear, 
therefore, that the Prefect of Berenike, was tasked with a multitude of crucial roles. These were 
related to maintenance and security in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea. This facilitated the 
Indian Ocean trade and ensured the collection of subsequent revenue. This again indicates the 
degree of state oversight by officials. However, this was not limited to the Prefect of Berenike 
since he was not the only prefect in the region. 
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The Prefect of the Herculian Sea and the Farasan Harbour 
Situated close to the mouth of the Red Sea and 60 kilometres from the Arabian coast it has 
been seen that Rome maintained a military presence on the Farasan Islands for at least thirty 
years between c.114 and 144 AD.476 It is also possible that Rome was active again on these 
islands by the 6th century AD.477 The latter of these two inscriptions shows that this garrison 
was under the command of another prefect, the praefectus of the Herculian sea and the Farasan 
harbour.478 While Speidel notes that the inscription does not spell out the prefect’s area of 
responsibility or his range of duties he suggests that the responsibilities of the Farasan Prefect 
were similar to those of the Prefect of Berenike.479 Indeed, as the Farasan Prefect’s title 
suggests, he was responsible for overseeing the Herculian Sea and the Farasan Harbour.480 
Similarly to Berenike, it is possible that the Farasan harbour acted as the headquarters of the 
Prefect and was Rome’s foremost military base within the Farasan island chain. On the other 
hand, McLaughlin notes that the Farasan inscription contains the only known reference to the 
Herculian Sea.481  
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to accept McLaughlin’s subsequent premise that this area 
included at least the entrance to the Red Sea and the straits of the Bab-el-Mandeb. Moreover, 
overseeing the Bab-el-Mandeb, as McLaughlin also suggests, will have required the Farasan 
Prefect to supervise naval forces that were likely stationed on the islands.482 The military nature 
of the Farasan prefecture is confirmed by the soldiers attested in the inscriptions as well as the 
existence of at least one Roman-era fortification on the island and several watchtowers.483 As 
a result, it has been suggested by McLaughlin, Sidebotham and others that the Farasan garrison 
was tasked with several important roles. These may have included providing security, levying 
tolls and taxes, preventing contraband goods from entering the empire, hunting pirates and, 
perhaps, guarding local pearl fisheries.484  
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All of these suggestions are likely, although, as Speidel has rightly cautioned, the enforcement 
of customs zones and the eradication of piracy would have required substantially more 
resources than a moderate garrison on a single island.485 Instead, both McLaughlin and 
Sidebotham rightly advise that several such bases would be necessary, although they 
acknowledge that these sites are yet to be found.486 Nonetheless, clearly, the Farasan Prefect 
was an important position with responsibility for a sizable military force and important civilian 
duties such as managing the harbour. Furthermore, the Farasan Prefect feasibly organised the 
delivery of supplies on the islands both for outgoing and incoming merchant vessels and the 
military.487 Lastly, while it is uncertain exactly who this prefect reported to it seems reasonable 
to suggest, based on the precedent of the Prefect of Berenike that the Farasan Prefect reported 
directly to the Prefect of Egypt in Alexandria.488 Thus, it is clear that the state sought to project 
power and closely monitor affairs some 1,000 kilometres from Egypt’s provincial border. 
However, the Farasan garrison was, as was shown previously, not the only state-controlled 
location which served as a base for Roman officials with a customs outpost attested at Leuke 
Kome in Nabataea.   
 
The Customs Post at Leuke Kome   
As has been seen the other overseas location which was associated with Rome’s Indian Ocean 
trade and administratively connected to the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea was Leuke Kome, 
which the Periplus states, was the site of a customs post.489 While the location of Leuke Kome 
is unknown, it was certainly in Arabia and, judging by the date of the Periplus, was active by 
the 1st century AD at the latest.490 Moreover, the Periplus states that the customs post was 
manned by an official and a centurion.491 However, as was recognised, scholarly debate has 
proliferated around whether this post was manned by either Roman or Nabataean officials.492 
Strabo makes it clear that at the time of Gallus’ campaign Leuke Kome was a part of the 
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kingdom of Nabataea.493 Based on this Bowerstock has argued and has been followed by 
Casson and De Romanis, that the customs post must have been manned by Nabateans since it 
would be unusual to have had a Roman garrison stationed in foreign territory.494 Moreover, 
Bowerstock has pointed out that the Nabataean kingdom had by this time adopted both Greek 
and Latin terms for military officers.495 In contrast, Young argues, for several reasons, that the 
Leuke Kome customs post must have been overseen by Roman officials and soldiers.496 The 
first reason for this, he suggests, is that the tetarte was a uniquely Roman tax.497  
The second and more convincing reason is that if the post was manned by Nabataean officials 
then by the time that merchants had reached Roman territory, they would have had to pay 50% 
of their goods to tax collectors. This suggestion is based on 25% being paid in Nabataean 
territory and another 25% being paid on reaching a Roman customs post. The closest of these 
to Leuke Kome is noted by Pliny the Elder as being at Gaza.498 The third reason that Young 
suggests that Leuke Kome was manned by Roman officials is that Pliny the Elder does not 
specify that the tax levied in Gaza was the tetarte.499 Young, therefore, points out that if the 
Nabataeans controlled Leuke Kome it would have meant that merchants had a tax-free means 
of importing Indian Ocean goods.500 As a result, Young argues that to close this loophole, the 
officials at Leuke Kome must have been Roman and must have passed any revenue onto the 
Roman state.501  
Sitting between these two interpretations Nappo sees Bowerstock’s reasoning as sound. 
However, he rightly emphasizes that Rome did garrison areas outside of imperial territory.502 
Moreover, Nappo proposes that since the author of the Periplus appears to have been an 
Egyptian, then his rendering of the term for centurion could be a Greek translation of a Latin 
term rather than the Nabatean equivalent.503 However, Nappo is reasonable to follow 
Sidebotham’s argument that the ethnicity of the officials in question cannot be concretely 
proven.504 Certainly, given the ambiguity of the terminology, the ethnicity of the individuals is 
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unclear despite the Egyptian origin of the author of the Periplus. On the other hand, while this 
is the safest view to adopt it is more likely to agree with Young, as was suggested in Chapter 
I, that the official and soldiers at Leuke Kome were Romans. Regardless, Nappo is right to 
highlight that knowing the origins of the Leuke Kome officials is, in practical terms, irrelevant 
since Rome would still have retained the customs revenue.505 This is because even with Leuke 
Kome being under the control of Nabataea, as Strabo shows that it was, Rome was still capable 
of extracting tribute from a politically independent power.  
This is shown in the case of the island of Jotabe which, following the shift of Rome’s Indian 
Ocean trade towards the northern ports from the 3rd century AD, seems to have acted as a 
customs post for the collection of tax revenue.506 Moreover, it is shown in a passage by 
Theophanes the Confessor that while the island belonged to an autonomous community they 
collected revenue and passed it onto the Roman Emperor.507 Under such circumstances, 
military action would only be undertaken if revenue was lost or withheld.508 This was likely 
the situation in Leuke Kome with the revenue potentially being handed over to the Prefect of 
Egypt (perhaps via the Prefect of Berenike) who, as suggested above, was responsible for 
ensuring the delivery of the tetarte to the fiscus in Rome. This could then be transported to 
locations such as the horrea piperataria: the state pepper warehouse in Rome.509 This situation 
indicates the powerful degree of state oversight in the region that had apparently been in place 
since the time of Strabo’s reference to Leuke Kome. This lasted until Trajan annexed Nabataea 
and subsequently transformed it into a province following the death of the last Nabataean King 
Rebbel II in 106 AD and was primarily intended, as Young suggests, to ensure the collection 
of tax revenue from the Indian Ocean trade.510   
 
The Arabarchia and the Paralemptes   
It has been established that the tetarte(s) was certainly the largest and most valuable tax that 
was levied on Rome’s Indian Ocean trade.511 The Coptos Tariff shows that this was delivered 
 
505 Nappo, 2015b, p.175.  
506 Nappo, 2015b, p.174.  
507 Theoph.Chronogr.P.141.1-11. 
508 Nappo, 2015a, p.169; 174.  
509 Evers, 2017, p.111; Cobb, 2018b, p.123; Dio.72.24.  
510 Nappo, 2015a, p.63-64.  
511 Evers, 2017; p.109; Cobb, 2018b, p.115. Evers, 2017, p.110 observes that the tetarte was possibly replaced 
by the octava sometime between 174 and 227 AD. See Codex Justinianus.4.65.7; Wilson, 2015, p.27-28.   
75 
 
to the imperial fiscus by the arabarchs.512 These officials are also mentioned in the Muziris 
papyrus as collecting a smaller tax directly from the recently docked Hermapollon.513 This was 
either a road-use duty or, as De Romanis has recently proposed, a series of surcharges on so-
called ‘sound’ ivory pepper and schidai (off-cuts from the tusks of live elephants).514 This 
group of officials appears to have been a consortium who together purchased the right to collect 
the tetarte from the Roman state and was led by a single individual who technically held the 
arabarchia.515 Despite a long history of Roman tax-farming the office of the arabarchia 
(ἀραβάρχης) potentially had its origins under the Ptolemies. Indeed, the earliest known holder 
of the title during the Roman period was named Ptolemy who held the post in 2 AD.516  Both 
Evers and De Romanis have suggested, probably correctly, that in contrast to other farmed 
taxes during the Republican and Imperial periods the cost of the tetarte contract was 
determined by the Prefect of Egypt. Evers has argued, moreover, that the activities of the 
arabarchia were overseen by the Prefect of Berenike.517  
Beneath the arabarchs, indeed, De Romanis has convincingly argued that he was appointed by 
them, seems to have been the Paralemptes (receiver), a sort of operations manager in charge of 
overseeing the cataloguing of goods and the collection of customs duties on the Indian Ocean 
trade and, as has already been seen, preventing smuggling.518 However, De Romanis has also 
convincingly shown that the various paralemptai that are attested at Berenike and Myos 
Hormos (except for Leuke Kome) were possibly just grammateis (secretaries) who operated 
on behalf of the appointed paralemptes. Instead, the paralemptes probably exercised his duties 
from one of the ‘emporia’ where the taxes were collected as opposed to one of the Red Sea 
ports where they were only catalogued and sealed.519 While the Coptos Tariff confirms that the 
tetarte was collected via public tax-farming until at least until AD 90, Evers has proposed that 
this changed by the 2nd century AD. This suggestion is based on the discovery of a Hadrianic 
era (117-138 AD) inscription which indicates that the office of the arabarchia had been 
 
512 Cobb, 2018b, p.114; OGIS 674. That this was delivered to the fiscus is shown by Plin.NH.6.84.    
513 Cobb, 2018b, p.114; P. Vindob.G.40822, recto col II, lines 7-11.  
514 Young, 2001, p.66-67; De Romanis, 2020, p.299-300. On schidai see De Romanis, 2017, p.369-380; 2020, 
p.217-222. 
515 De Romanis, 2020, p.302; Evers, 2017, p.109; Burkhalter, 1999, p.44-45; 48-50; Rathbone, 2002, p.183; P. 
Vindob.G.40822, Verso col I, line 2.  
516 Evers, 2017, p.109; Burkhalter, 1999, p.50-51. no 1-2; 53. no 9; Tempel V Dukke III 47a-b.  
517 Evers, 2017, p.110; De Romanis, 2020, p.302.  
518 Cobb, 2018b, p.114; Ast and Bagnall, 2016, p.177; 178-183; De Romanis, 2020, p.p307-308; Cuvigny, 2005, 
p.15-16 citing Burkhalter; Cuvigny, 2014, p.172; 174 Cuvigny, 2005, p.59-62. K256; 312; OGIS 202; I. 
Portes.70 
519 De Romanis, 2020, p.304-308; Cuvigny, 2005, p.15-16 citing Burkhalter; Cuvigny, 2014, p.172; 174; Cobb, 
2018b, p.114-115.  
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integrated into the civil service by Hadrian’s death at the latest.520 After this time, based on the 
inscription, Evers suggests, that the arabarchia was overseen by a procurator.521 This was most 
plausibly an imperial freedman.522 On the other hand, while De Romanis recognises that the 
arabarchia may have been ‘privatised’ for some time he cautions that this was presumably 
short and probably only covered the period in which Trajan’s canal was constructed and 
inaugurated.523 After this, he points to evidence that the tetarte was once again farmed publicly 
during the 2nd century AD.524  
That De Romanis proposition is plausibly correct is supported by the fact that other taxes 
continued to be publicly farmed across Egypt and at sites of importance to Roman trade with 
the East such as Palmyra until at least 170 AD.525 Nevertheless, that the arabarchia was 
transitioned, however briefly, to state control by the early 2nd century AD approximately during 
the peak of Rome’s Indian Ocean trade by the end of the 1st century AD is significant.526 While 
the Roman state seems to have primarily relied on tax farming (an approach commonly 
practised by ancient states) to reduce the need for a large administrative apparatus Tan rightly 
acknowledges that this could have caused large quantities of revenue to be absorbed by 
middlemen.527 It appears, therefore, that with a period of exponential growth in commercial 
activity and potentially the development of an important infrastructural asset to support it in 
Trajan’s renovation of the Nile canal the Roman state sought to briefly become directly 
involved in aspects such as taxation. This should be no surprise given the potentially vast sums 
of money involved.528 Indeed, what this example perhaps more than any other shows is that the 
state sought to oversee the affairs of the Indian Ocean trade and would adapt pre-existing 
systems to do so. Such an action was, again, reactive and was taken in response to changing 




520 Evers, 2017, p.110; Jördens, 2009, p.359. no 15; AE 1999. no 418; OGIS 674. 
521 Jördens, 2009, p.359. no 15; AE 1999. no 418.  
522 Jördens, 2009, p.359. no 15; AE 1999. no 418.  
523 De Romanis, 2015a, p.125, f.5 shows that the canal seems to have begun construction in 112 AD.   
524 De Romanis, 2020, p.302; AE 1999 I. Eph.3.627; 7.3056; A 1559.  
525 Evers, 2017, p.110; inv X 29; X 13. It should be remembered that as Sommer, 2017, p.123 notes Palmyra had 
a very high degree of autonomy despite technically being part of the Roman province of Syria.  
526 Tomber 2008, p.24; Cobb, 2015a, p.363-390. 
527 Tan, 2017, p.41.  
528 See the Introduction for a discussion of the revenue potential of the tetarte during the imperial period.  
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Managing the Quarries   
It has been observed that with the establishment of Mons Claudianus and Mons Porphyrites in 
the 1st century AD the management of these locations appears to have been transferred from 
the authority of the Prefect of Berenike to that of an imperial procurator. This individual was, 
as I. Pan 21, O. Claud. Inv 4739 and 7737 suggest, probably an (ex-)slave in the service of the 
Emperor.529 Moreover, as was also noted the discovery of receipts from several of the quarries 
has led Cuvigny to suggest that Mons Claudianus, Mons Porphyrites, Mons Ophiates and 
Triberiane belonged to a single administrative unit. In support of this view Hirt highlights two 
individuals who served as procurators one of whom, Ephadorites Sigerinos, is shown to have 
been managing both Mons Claudianus and Mons Porphyrites. Moreover, Hirt has sensibly 
suggested that the second official, Ulpius Himeras, who appears in the epigraphy in connection 
to Mons Claudianus should be identified with a procurator of the same name serving at Mons 
Ophiates in 152/3 AD.530 Rightly, therefore, Hirt confers with Cuvigny that the quarries seem 
to have come to be under the direction of a single imperial procurator rather than the Prefect of 
Berenike. Given the expansion of quarrying, this opinion certainly seems reasonable since all 
quarries and mines in the empire technically belonged to and were managed by the imperial 
estate.531          
Indeed, an ostracon from Mons Claudianus shows that on a day-to-day basis reports on the 
quarry’s progress were referred to a legionary centurion prefect.532 Moreover, it has been 
established that a centurion oversaw the site. This is shown by the fact that this centurion along 
with the decurio received the largest share of water.533 To find legionary officers managing 
quarry sites is, it has been stated, not unusual and these can be found across the empire. This 
included the Eastern Desert with centurions also recorded at Mons Porphyrites and Mons 
Ophiates.534 It has been suggested that the choice of centurions to command the quarries may 
have been due to their expertise in such operations and Hirt proposes that this was the case for 
Annius Rufus who may have obtained the relevant knowledge during his legion’s posting in 
other provinces with active quarries.535 For Maxfield, the centurions that were transferred 
 
529 Hirt, 2011, p.107-108; I. Pan 21; O. Claud. Inv.4739; 7737.  
530 Hirt, 2011, p.107-108; I. Pan 21; O. Claud. Inv.4739; 7737. 
531 Mattingly, 2006, p.291-292.  
532 O.Claud.inv.1538+2921. 
533 Hirt, 2011, p.168-169; Maxfield, 2003, p.163. 
534 Hirst, 2011, p.169; Maxfield, 2002, p.150-152; I. Pan 21; 22; 53.  
535 Hirt, 2011, p.170; 175; I. Pan 42.  
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potentially over great distances from their parent legions represent direct appointments by the 
Emperor.536  
While this is certainly suggested by the ostraca Hirt has rightly observed that the provincial 
governor could equally have had a hand in requesting these transfers and Pliny the Younger 
implies this in his letters to Trajan during the 1st century AD.537 Nonetheless, Pliny also shows 
in a request for a centurion to manage commercial traffic in the city of Juliopolis that the 
Emperor would often have to personally approve such a transfer.538 Regardless, the chain of 
officials in charge of the quarries in the Eastern Desert by the late 1st century AD is confirmed 
by a copy of two letters from the curatratores of the praesidium at Mons Claudianus. One of 
these is to the quarry’s centurion and the second is addressed to the procurator.539 This 
delineates a structure which suggests that while the quarries were managed by centurions who, 
in turn, worked closely with the curatores of the nearby praesidium and were overseen by the 
procurator who then reported directly to the imperial household in Rome. Thus, this major 
administrative reformation is a second example of the state seeking to oversee not just the 
Indian Ocean trade but also the Eastern Desert. Similarly, these actions were intended to secure 
valuable resources.          
 
The Role of Imperial Slaves and Freedmen   
Imperial freedmen (former slaves who had been granted freedom) were considered members 
of the familia caesaris.540 More importantly from an administrative perspective however 
freedmen, along with slaves, belonging to the imperial family were responsible for managing 
imperial property and finances.541 Indeed Weaver has suggested that a strict hierarchy existed 
ranging from sub-clerical positions to clerical ones and finally to posts such as senior 
administrators. The latter positions, Weaver suggests, would have been fulfilled by imperial 
freedmen.542 Indeed, the potential involvement of imperial slaves and freedmen has already 
been observed in the cases of the procurators of the Eastern Desert quarries and collecting the 
 
536 Maxfield, 2000, p.435.  
537 Hirt, 2011, p.172; Plin.EP.10. 41; 42; 61; 62.  
538 Plin.EP.10.77.  
539 Hirt, 2011, p.168. 
540 Paterson, 2013, p.143.  
541 Paterson, 2013, p.143. 
542 Weaver, 1972, p.227-267. 
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tetarte while it was not being publicly farmed. Nevertheless, imperial freedmen could certainly 
obtain immense power, influence and recognition in the service of the Emperor with Augustus 
granting his doctor the gold ring of an equestrian and Suetonius suggests that Claudius’ 
freedmen, the favourite of which was Narcissus, could even determine the holders of military 
commands.543 It should be no surprise, therefore, to find freedmen such as Ephadorites 
Sigerinos and Ulpius Himeras being granted responsibility for the major quarries of the Eastern 
Desert. On the other hand, Sidebotham and more recently Bowman has suggested that several 
individuals active in the Eastern Desert may be identified as imperial agents who were 
participating in the Indian Ocean trade on behalf of the imperial family.544  
There is no doubt that this collection of references that come from the Nikanor Archive and the 
Berenike customs passes mention several ‘slaves of Caesar.’ These were connected both to 
Emperor Tiberius and, perhaps, even to Narcissus, Claudius’ infamous freedman.545 However, 
Cobb is right to argue that the evidence does not fully confirm if these agents were actively 
engaging in trade or simply the procurement of supplies.546 Nonetheless, it is clear from seals 
discovered in Alexandria labelled as ‘spices of Caesar’ that the imperial family was involved 
in obtaining goods from the Indian Ocean.547 However, this could just as easily have been the 
portion of the tetarte which Evers proposes was not converted into cash in Alexandria and was 
instead shipped to Rome for consumption directly by the imperial household.548 As a result, 
while the involvement of the imperial family in the Indian Ocean trade cannot as of yet be 
confirmed this additional evidence does demonstrate the proclivity of imperial freedmen, their 
agents and imperial slaves in the Eastern Desert region. This further validates the supposition 
outlined above that imperial agents served as procurators and came to manage the imperial 
quarries. Furthermore, the presence of several imperial agents, alongside these state appointees 
of the imperial household shows the extent to which not only the provincial government but 




543 Paterson, 2007, p.143; Dio.53.30.3; Suet. Div.Claud.29.   
544 Sidebotham, 1986, p.114; Bowman, 2010, p.106–107. Nappo and Zerbini, 2011, p. 65 argue that such a 
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It has been shown throughout this chapter that numerous state officials and agents were 
appointed to oversee almost every aspect of activity related to the Eastern Desert, the Red Sea, 
and the Indian Ocean trade. This included everything from quarry output to sourcing potable 
water, providing security and, vitally, overseeing tax collection. This resulted in the creation 
of a complex network of officials that spanned from small island garrisons up to the Prefect of 
Egypt in Alexandria and, finally, to the Emperor in Rome. Moreover, while Cuvigny has been 
hesitant to suggest that administration in the region was divided into distinct two zones this 
appears to have been the case. This probably took place following the establishment of the 
imperial quarries in the 1st century AD. As a result, the Prefect of Berenike oversaw the ports, 
roads, praesidia and the collection of tax revenue from the Indian Ocean trade. In contrast, the 
procurator metallorum managed the quarries north of Coptos on behalf of the Prefect of Egypt 
and the Emperor. On the other hand, it has been observed that this situation was not initially 
the case. Formally, duties such as managing quarries were within the remit of the Prefect of 
Berenike and the collection of the tetarte was, at least at one point, privatised by the state. 
However, by the time of Hadrian’s death and the peak of Rome’s commerce in the Indian 
Ocean the state seems to have conducted a major reform of its administration in the region.549 
This course of action was likely a reactive effort motivated by the desire to ensure state 
supervision of the growing Indian Ocean trade and to proactively ensure the collection of future 
tax revenue.     
  
 
549 It was suggested to the author in a conversation with Dr Kyle Erickson that the division of officials in the 
way outlined above may also have been to prevent the chance of any one of them obtaining too much power and 
influence. It should be noted, however, that this conversation was in relation to the earlier Ptolemaic presence in 





[The emperor Trajan] who, by his authority, advice, and loyalty has 
opened up roads, provided harbours, given routes to the land, let the 
sea into the shore, and extended the shore out to sea, and has mixed 
different peoples by trade to such an extent that whatever is produced 
anywhere seems to have originated among everyone.550 
 
This thesis has sought to better understand the nature of the relationship between the Roman 
state and the Mediterranean trade in the Indian Ocean. While many scholars recognise that the 
state made significant and often proactive investments in infrastructure some, such as Young, 
have argued that the state was, in general, only involved reactively beyond monitoring 
merchants. Also, Young has suggested that all state involvement was motivated by a desire to 
collect the large amount of revenue that could be obtained by taxing Indian Ocean imports. 
However, it has been argued in this thesis that these two views are not mutually exclusive and 
that a more nuanced stance is needed. To that end it has been shown that by the early 2nd century 
AD Rome had committed potentially up to 20% of its military in Egypt to the Eastern Desert 
and the Red Sea for tasks related to the Indian Ocean trade. It has, moreover, been suggested 
that these troops had two primary duties. The first of these was to provide security to merchants 
and civilians both in the Eastern Desert and the Red Sea. This was done, principally by 
defending the praesidia and patrolling known hot spots in the Red Sea. The second duty was 
to ensure that an adequate supply of potable water was available and, perhaps, to control access 
to it. This was achieved through the close connection between the praesidia and wells of 
potable water, delivering this water via the postal service and providing a military escort for 
larger supply caravans. However, it has also been acknowledged that the military also played 
roles in preventing smuggling and conducting campaigns against the barbaroi.  Finally, it has 
been argued that many state officials, as well as managing other activities, oversaw these tasks 
and ensured that they were performed effectively.  
 
550 Plin.Pan.29.2-3, trans Wilson and Bowman 2017. 
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The reason for this high level of state oversight and action in the Eastern Desert and the Red 
was, as Young rightly suggests, almost certainly to collect revenue from the Indian Ocean trade. 
On the other hand, the more nuanced position that has been advocated throughout this thesis 
has shown that while the activities that were undertaken by Rome’s soldiers in the region were 
actions that were designed to proactively ensure the future collection of the tetarte these were 
likely introduced reactively. This is not to imply that such measures were centrally planned as 
part of a wider state policy. Instead, the basis of actions such as the deployment of troops and 
the use of fortified stations were likely introduced in accordance with earlier Ptolemaic 
precedent. The Roman state then seems to have gradually increased these precautions 
reactively in response to an increasingly hostile environment in the Eastern Desert and the Red 
Sea and the growth of the Indian Ocean trade itself. Indeed, that such measures generally 
appeared alongside these two developments at the end of the 1st century AD indicates that this 
was the case. What came to be a steadily implemented policy of proactively securing revenue 
then lasted at least until the decline of Rome’s Indian Ocean trade in the 3rd century AD.551 
Nonetheless, to see the state responding in such a way represents a significant and more 
nuanced development in our understanding of the relationship between the Roman state and 
the Indian Ocean trade and moves beyond a traditional proactive versus reactive viewpoint. 
While this stance cannot be proved conclusively, and because it is not clear that such considered 
involvement in economic activity on the part of the state was universal this could have 
important ramifications for these questions. Certainly, therefore these issues deserve to be 











The Status of Egypt as a Province 
 
Amongst the forty-four provinces that comprised the Roman Empire by the reign of Marcus 
Aurelius (161-180 AD) Egypt had held a special status since the conquest of Augustus.552 The 
distinctly imperial nature of the province was established by Augustus’ proscription that no 
senator was to enter the province without his express consent.553 This special status, it has been 
suggested, was for serval reasons. The first of these was due to the role that Egypt played in 
supplying the grain on which the people of Rome depended.554 This demand was substantial 
with estimates suggesting that 700,000 people could have required 70,000 modii of grain per 
month and 1 million inhabitants needed 60,000 tons of grain every four months.555 
Nevertheless, shortages in the grain supply were common.556 This could significantly 
undermine the political stability of the Emperor in his capital.557 Alongside this, the special 
status of Egypt has been attributed to the comparative wealth of the province to others 
throughout the Roman Empire.558  
Indeed, McLaughlin has suggested, that Egypt had a much greater economic value than many 
of the other provinces and possibly provided as much as 600 million sesterces per year to the 
fiscus during the Roman period.559 This McLaughlin suggests, was a result of Egypt’s 
agricultural revenue and the additional income from taxing the Indian Ocean trade.560 This 
combination potentially put the revenue of Egypt, perhaps as much as several, orders of 
magnitude above that of some other provinces at different points in time.561 While Duncan-
Jones has highlighted that both of the figures which McLaughlin would later use have rightly 
 
552 Eck, 2019, p.188; Ackeren, 2019, p.1; Derda, 2019, p.58.   
553 Dio.51.17.1.   
554 Derda, 2019, p.58; McLaughlin ,2014, p.21-25 suggests that Egypt supplied one-third of the grain which 
Rome needed. 
555 Tchernia, 2016, p.214; Jos. BJ. 2.383; 386. T 
556 Tchernia, 2016, p.208; Tac. Ann. 12. 43.2-4.  
557 Derda, 2019, p.58.  
558 McLaughlin, 2010, p.167; 2014, p.19-20. Adams, 2019, p.233 argues that, by the Roman period, Egypt had 
become one of the richest, most heavily populated, and urbanised regions of the empire.  
559 McLaughlin, 2010, p.167; 2014, p.19-20. 
560 McLaughlin, 2019, p.117-118.  
561  McLaughlin 2010, p.167-168; 2014, p.20; 2019, p.117-120.   
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been subjected to criticism it should not be doubted that Egypt possessed immense wealth.562 
This supposition is one that is strongly supported by sources such as Josephus.563 Regardless, 
the perceived value of gems and precious metals obtained from the Eastern Desert would have 
provided an additional motive for a special degree of imperial interest in the province.564 
Finally, the addition of the rare and valuable stone produced by sites such as Mons Claudianus 
and Mons Porphyrites which were used in major imperial projects such as Hadrian’s villa at 
Tibur provides yet another justification for the special status of Egypt.565  
  
 
562 Duncan-Jones, 1994, p.53; 254.   
563 Jos. BJ.2.16.4.  
564 Sidebotham et al, 2008, p.277.  




Rome’s Military Deployment in the Eastern Desert and 
the Red Sea 
 
Deployed  Evidence  Estimate  
Praesidia  Remains/Rotas  780 men 
Quarries  Inscription  60 men + 
Ports  Literary/Remains  100 men + 
Fleet Literary/Ostraca 400 men + 
Leuke Kome Literary Sources  50-80 men 
Farasan  Inscriptions  110 +  
External Bases  Literary Sources  500 to 1,000 men 
Total: 1,500 to 2,000 men  
 





Rome’s Military Deployment in Egypt 
 
Century  Troops Deployed  
(auxilia and legionaries) 
Evidence  
Late 1st century BC to 
early 1st century AD  
c.22,000 men Strab.17.1.12 
23 AD c.16,000 men Tac.Ann.4.5 
120s AD c.11-12,000 men BGU I 140 





Eastern Desert and Red Sea Officials 















































Aelius Aristides, Orations. M. Trapp (trans.). 2017. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 
Apicius, Roman Cookery. Edwards, J (trans.). 1984. London: Rider and Company.    
Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti. P. A. Brunt and J. M. Moore (eds.). 1967. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Burstein, S. M. (2010) On the Erythraean Sea Farnham: Ashgate Publishers. 
Casson, L. 1989. The Periplus Maris Erythraei: Text with introduction, translation, and 
commentary. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library. Volume One. Lauren, G (trans.). 2014. Saphron.  
Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library. Volume Two. Lauren, G (trans.). 2014. Saphron. 
Dio Cassius, Roman History. C. Earnest (trans.). 1914. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 
Dio Chrysostom, Discourses. H. L. Crosby (trans.). 1946. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press.  
Hägg, T. Pierce, H. R. and Török, L (eds.) (1998) Fontes historiae Nubiorum: textual sources 
for the history of the middle Nile region between the eighth century BC and the sixth century 
AD. Vol. III, From the first to the sixth century AD. Bergen: University of Bergen.  
Jerome, Letters. F. A. Wright (trans.). 1933. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.  
Josephus, The Jewish War. H. St. J. Thackeray (trans.). 1928. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press.  
Josephus, Jewish Antiquities. M. Ralph and W. Allen (trans.). 1943. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Justin, Codex. F. H. Blume (trans.). 2016. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Lucian. Alexander the False Prophet. A.M. Harmon (trans.). 1925. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press.  
89 
 
Marcus Aurelius, Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines (trans.). 1916. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Martial, Epigrams. D. R. S. Baily (trans.). 1993. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Pliny the Elder, The Natural History. J. Bostock (trans.). 1855. London: Taylor and Francis. 
Pliny, Letters. B. Radice (trans.). 1963. London: Penguin.    
Strabo, Geography. L. H. Jones (trans.). 1897. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Suetonius, Life of the Divine Augustus. J. C. Rolfe (trans.). 1914. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Suetonius, Life of the Divine Claudius. J. C. Rolfe (trans.). 1914. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Suetonius, Life of the Divine Vespasian. J. C. Rolfe (trans.). 1914. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Tacitus, Annals. J. Jackson (trans). 1937. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.  
Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle. H. Turtledove (trans.). 1982. Philadelphia: 
Pennsylvania University Press.   
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. F. C. Smith (trans.). 1920. Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press. 
Virgil, Georgics. H. R. Fairclough (trans.). 1999. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
Modern Scholarship:  
Adams, C. (1995) ‘Supplying the Roman Army:" Q. Petr.’ 245. Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und 
Epigraphik. 119-124. 
Adams, C (2002) ‘Who bore the burden? The organisation of stone transport in Roman Egypt.’. 
In Mattingly, D. J and Salmon, B. J (eds.) Economies beyond Agriculture in the Classical 
World. London: Routledge. 171-192.     
Adams, C. (2007) Land transport in Roman Egypt: a study of economics and administration 
in a Roman province. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Adams, C. (2019) ‘Stimuli for irrigation, agriculture and Quarrying.’ In Vandorpe, K (ed.) A 
Companion to Greco-Roman and Late Antique Egypt. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons. 323-250.  
90 
 
Ando, C. (2006) ‘The administration of the provinces.’ In Potter, D.S (ed.) A companion to the 
Roman Empire. 175-192. 
Ast, R. and Bagnall, R. (2016) Documents from Berenike Volume III: Greek and Latin Texts 
from the 2009–2013 Seasons. Bruxelles: Association égyptologique Reine Elisabeth. 
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Brun, J. P. (2006b) ‘Méthodes et conditions de fouille des fortins et desdépotoirs ou les 
affresd’un Gallo-Romainen Égypte.’ In Cuvigny, H (ed.) Leroutede Myos Hormos: L’armée 
romaine dans le desert Orientald’ Égypte. Volumes 1 and 2. Cairo: Boustany's Publishing 
House. 61–71.   
Brun, J.P. (2018) ‘Chronology of the Forts of the Routes to Myos Hormos and Berenike during 
the Graeco-Roman Period.’ In Brun, J. Faucher, T. Redon, B and Sidebotham, S. E (eds.) The 
Eastern Desert of Egypt during the Greco-Roman Period: Archaeological Reports. Paris: 
Collège de France. 143-226.  
Bülow-Jacobsen, A. (2013) ‘Communication, Travel, and Transportation in Egypt's Eastern 
Desert during Roman Times (1st to 3rd century AD).’ In Förster, F and Rimer, H (eds.)  Desert 
Road Archaeology in Ancient Egypt and Beyond. Köln: Heinrich-Barth-Institut. 557-559. 
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Hormos: L’armée romaine dans le desert Orientald’ Égypte. Volumes 1 and 2. Cairo: 
Boustany's Publishing House. 295-359. 
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